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"The ... difficult ... problem is to deal with men who are not selfish and who are
good citizens, but who cannot see the social and economic consequences of their actions
in a modern economically interdependent community." '
-President Franklin D. Roosevelt
"We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclu-
sively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts. '2
-Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
I. Introduction
Antitrust law, by proscribing monopoly conduct and unreasonable restraints
of trade, promotes the advancement of society by ensuring the efficient allocation
of society's resources. U.S. antitrust law is premised on the theory that the best
method for advancing consumer welfare is the protection of competition, which
encourages a level playing field, competitive pricing, and enhanced consumer
choice. Because of these benefits, most industrialized nations of the world today
have some form of antitrust law. Not many years ago the application of a nation's
antitrust law was typically confined to regulating conduct occurring within the
territorial limits of that nation. With the current globalization of the world's
economies into a single economic unit, however, extraterritorial anticompetitive
conduct can now significantly affect a nation's domestic commerce. Nations can
no longer afford to limit the scope of their antitrust laws to domestic anticompeti-
tive conduct while leaving foreign companies exempt from those antitrust laws
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1. ELEANOR M. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN 2 (1970) (quoting President Franklin D. Roose-
velt from a Message to the Congress, Apr. 29, 1938).
2. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
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or their equivalents. Limiting antitrust laws to domestic conduct has provided
and would continue to provide foreign companies with a substantial advantage
over domestic companies that are playing by a stricter set of rules.
Unfortunately, the antitrust laws of the various industrialized nations differ in
their substance and in their application. Not all countries subscribe to the view
that promoting consumer welfare is the optimal method of advancing society's
well-being. In particular, the antitrust laws of the United States and Japan, while
very similar in substantive content, differ markedly in their application. Japan
furthers its societal stability and well-being by protecting supplier welfare and
preserving jobs. In contrast, the protection of specific competitors has been ex-
pressly rejected in the United States, at least in theory. These underlying philo-
sophical differences are very difficult to reconcile and have been the source of
much conflict between the two countries.
For the foregoing reasons, the United States, the most aggressive enforcer of
antitrust laws in the world, has increasingly applied its antitrust laws to anticom-
petitive conduct occurring outside of its territorial boundaries, much to the con-
sternation of other nations, including Japan. Because other nations perceive that
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction infringes on their sovereignty, extrater-
ritorial U.S. enforcement has resulted in considerable international criticism and
conflict. In fact, Japan believes that increased U.S. enforcement is aimed directly
at Japan because of Japan's post-World War II economic success.
This article compares Japan's antimonopoly laws and policies with those of
the United States, and discusses the interaction of the two. Part II of this article
reviews the history of Japanese industry; Part IMl traces the development of Japan's
antimonopoly laws following World War II; Part IV outlines the current status
of Japanese enforcement policy; Part V briefly describes the U.S. antitrust laws;
Part VI details the problems associated with extraterritorial application of those
laws, and also describes some of the international conflicts caused by extraterrito-
rial enforcement, while Part VII asserts that globalization of the world's econo-
mies is forcing such extraterritorial enforcement; Part VIII describes the various
unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral attempts at solving extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion problems; and finally, Part IX concludes by proposing that an initial goal
should be bilateral harmonization of the U.S. and Japanese antitrust laws while
multi-national harmonization of the antitrust laws is the best long-term solution.
II. History of Japan's Industrial Development
The arrival of Commodore Perry's fleet in the port of Uraga in 1853 signaled
the beginning of the end of the Tokugawa government of Japan and the start of
what would become known as the Meiji era. By the time Commodore Perry
forwarded President Fillmore's request to open trade with the rest of the world,
Japan had maintained a self-imposed closed society for roughly two hundred and
fifty years.
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In response to President Fillmore's request, Japan signed a treaty promising
to protect shipwrecked American sailors, sell coal to the U.S. Navy, and open
two ports to commerce with the United States, thus opening Japan's markets to
trade with the rest of the world. Due in part to Japan's previous self-imposed
isolation, Japan had fallen behind much of the world in military strength and
technological power. Because of Japan's lack of bargaining strength and knowl-
edge of international law, Japanese trade negotiations with the United States
and the European nations resulted in treaties that were quite unfavorable to the
Japanese. 3 These trade treaties were so unfair that they became a source of shame
to the Japanese, and the ruling Meiji government began working toward their
renegotiation. 4
The Meiji government, which replaced the Tokugawa government, believed
that a radical transformation in the Japanese economy was necessary if Japan
was to achieve equal bargaining power with the rest of the world.5 The basis of this
transformation was the rapid changeover from an agrarian-based feudal system, in
which wealth was derived from land ownership, to an industrial society, in which
6wealth was derived from the application of capital to production.
During this economic transformation, the Japanese government took a very
active role in forcing and overseeing the change to a capitalist society, even to
the point of directly controlling some businesses. This behavior seems normal
given the fact that just prior to the transformation Japan had a feudal society.
The rapid transformation of economic means, from a land-based system to an
industrial system, occurred without a similar change in the economic incentives.
Japan never underwent the shift in power from the very few extremely wealthy
land owners to a larger, more middle-class group. Thus, Japan not only retains
much of the caste system, but also an acceptance of large concentrations of wealth.
In contrast to Japan and Europe, and with the exception of occasional discover-
ies of large amounts of oil, land was not the source of wealth in the United States.
Although good farmland or good grazing ranges were sources of wealth, there
was always more land just a little farther west. Furthermore, the people attracted
to the task of developing the United States were in large part from the lower
classes of the European caste systems who believed that risks and hardships were
outweighed by the chance to improve their lives. As a result, the United States
3. See YOSIYUKI NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 41 (1976). Under the Tokugawa
treaties concluded in 1854, Japan could not impose more than a five percent tariff on many imports.
See also HIROSHI IYORi & AKINORI UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS AND POLICIES OF JAPAN
20 n.5 (1994). Hiroshi Iyori, a former Commissioner of the Japanese Federal Trade Commission,
claims that the low tariff forced Japanese industry to develop under competitive free trade conditions.
See id. at 2. Mr. Iyori, however, also concedes that a lack of foreign currency and poor transportation
infrastructure functioned to prevent imports during the period the domestic economy was expanding.
See id.
4. See NODA, supra note 3, at 41.
5. See IVoRi & UESUGI, supra note 3, at 20 n. 5.
6. See NODA, supra note 3, at 42.
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never developed a strong caste system. The United States has a history of at
least stated equality, private land ownership, private industry, and a tremendous
admiration for the entrepreneur, or self-made man.
Since modern Japan developed without significant contact between the general
population and the rest of the world, it is only natural that the status quo of public
reliance on a benevolent feudal lord would be transformed into reliance on a
pervasive benevolent government. The legacy of the relationship between feudal
lord and-farmer-tenant is still evident through the close cooperation between
Japenese business and government, even though the economy is considered an
7independent market economy.
One result of the isolation of the Japanese nation is that the Japanese tend to
have a much more homogenous view of the purpose and goals of their society.
The Japanese have often been characterized as taking a long-term view of their
economic development. Additionally, one commentator states that because the
Japanese tradition in economics has been a mixture of German historical thought
and Marxism, the Japanese view economic development as a long process in
which each stage may require an entirely different approach. 8 The Japanese tradi-
tions, and their reliance on German economic thought, resulted in their pursuit
of what Lester Thurow terms "producer economics." 9
Americans, in contrast, have very divergent beliefs and economic goals.' 0 As
a result, the United States relies on the conflicts that arise from zealous competition
between divergent interests to efficiently allocate resources of production. This
economic tradition relies on the belief that economic truths are applicable regard-
less of the situation."
A. THE RISE OF CARTELS AND THE ZAIBATSU
The Japanese do not share the distrust for power that Americans have. 2 Without
the distrust of power, the Japanese see no reason to challenge a given industry
or business merely because it is large. This tendency is in absolute opposition
7. See HADLEY, supra note 1, at 36-37.
8. See id. at 13.
9. LESTER THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD 32 (1992).
Germany and Japan trumpet communitarian values: business groups, social responsibil-
ity for skills, teamwork, firm loyalty, industry strategies, and active industrial policies
that promote growth. Anglo-Saxon firms are profit maximizers; Japanese business firms
play a game that might better be known as "strategic conquest".... Japanese believe
in "producer economics."
Id.
10. See id. "America and Britain trumpet individualistic values: the brilliant entrepreneur, Nobel
Prize winners, large wage differentials, individual responsibility for skills, easy to fire and easy to
quit, profit maximization, and hostile mergers and takeovers-their hero is the Lone Ranger. ...
Americans believe in 'consumer economics.' " Id.
It. See id.
12. See id. at 14. This trust in power is attributed to the Confucian heritage.
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to the American belief, as reflected in the U.S. antitrust laws where the mere
existence of monopoly power is actionable. 13 Given the Japanese acceptance of,
or even reliance on, the control of a centralized government and the respect for
concentrations of power, it seems only natural that powerful business entities
would prosper in Japan.
Cartels-horizontal groups of businesses in the same industry-first started to
develop in Japan in the 1880s, 14 prior to the enactment of Japan's Commercial
Code. In addition to the emerging cartels, the Japanese economic system also
included family-run business combines, called zaibatsu.15 The original zaibatsu
were the remnants of the feudal structure and represented the major feudal clans,
or han.
16
The Japanese Commercial Code, enacted in 1899, was based on the German
commercial law system. 7 Because modem Japanese economic thought was based
on German thought, the Japanese followed the German beliefs that cartels helped
avoid harmful aspects of competition such as predatory pricing and that cartels
tended to stabilize the economy and promote efficiency.' 8 In addition to the
efficiency arguments in favor of cartels, the control that cartels exercised on the
market in which they operated provided the government with an important tool
with which to fight recession.1 9 The perceived efficiency gains were so great that
the Japanese government even took steps to strengthen and protect the cartels,2 °
and sometimes went so far as to officially authorize the cartels.2' With the official
blessing of the Japanese government, the number of cartels increased from twenty
in 1925 to 850 in 1936.22
The Japanese government was able to maintain control of the economy, in
part, through the regulation of cartels. 23 The 1936 amendments to the Important
Industries Control Act included a system for authorizing new entries into regulated
industries. 24 The entry barrier created by this approval process further strength-
ened the power of existing cartels by restricting the ability of others to enter the
market. Additionally, some regulations required businesses in cartel-dominated
13. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
14. See Ivopi & UESUGI, supra note 3, at 3.
15. The term zaibatsu refers to an estate of wealth and is sometimes used to refer to federations
of businesses, or combines. The term cartel, however, will be limited to horizontal grouping of
companies that produce or consume the same good or service. See HADLEY, supra note 1, at 20-21.
16. See id. at 33.
17. See MITSUO MATSUSHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW IN JAPAN 2
(1993). As it exists today, the Japanese Commercial Code is a hybrid of German, American, and
traditional Japanese law. See id.
18. See IvoRI & UESUGI, supra note 3, at 4.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 5.
21. See id. at7.
22. See id. at 9.
23. See MATSUSHITA, supra note 17, at 76.
24. See IYoto & UESUGI, supra note 3, at 8.
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industries to follow the market lead of the cartel, effectively giving the cartel
100 percent of the market power.
In addition to the official endorsement of cartels, existing economic conditions
also led to concentrations of market power. Some of the zaibatsu controlled vast
financial resources.25 The period of world-wide recession immediately following
World War I helped to concentrate the growing industrial segment of the Japanese
economy, as the weaker companies were forced to merge with the stronger zaiba-
tsu who controlled the financial institutions.26 The zaibatsu also used their finan-
cial strength and close governmental connections to acquire troubled, and state-
run, businesses.
27
Interestingly, although the government approved of cartels, the military and
the public both expressed anti-zaibatsu sentiments. 28 Nevertheless, the power of
the zaibatsu to control markets strengthened during World War H, due to the
focus on the efficient production of war material. 29 During the war, the four
largest zaibatsu doubled their share of the Japanese economy, often through the
Japanese military simply giving the zaibatsu industrial developments captured
during the war.30 In spite of the public sentiments against the zaibatsu, and unlike
western nations where the middle-class gained access to political and economic
power, the Japanese zaibatsu never experienced an uprising of the middle class,
and the political power structure of Japan remained stable and in power.
III. Post-WWH Development of Japanese Antimonopoly Laws
The post-World War II changes to Japan imposed by the victorious allied forces
were intended to completely transform Japan. These changes were the result of
peace conditions imposed by the Allies on the defeated nations of World War
II and were different from the conditions imposed on the defeated nations in
previous wars. One commentator stated that since the warfare was "total," so
too the peace conditions were "total," requiring the submission of the entire
political and economic structures of the defeated nations.3 Thus, for the first
time, the peace conditions went beyond territorial changes, limitations on military
power, and reparations for war-time injury.32
Following World War II, the U.S. army occupied Japan and attempted to
change the culture and social structure of Japanese society into a western-style
democratic system. At least part of the rationale behind this policy was to reduce
the ability of the Japanese military to rebuild. One of the major changes to the
25. See HADLEY, supra note 1, at 29.
26. See IYolu & UESUGI, supra note 3, at 5.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 9.
29. See id. at 10.
30. See HADLEY, supra note 1, at 41.
31. See id. at 3.
32. See id.
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Japanese industrial segment involved dissolution of the zaibatsu. Whether or not
the zaibatsu had directly promoted the imperialist actions of the Japanese, they
had profited tremendously from the war and prevented the rise of a middle class,
which traditionally opposed militarism.33 The breakup of the zaibatsu, and the
efforts to end cartels, are continuing themes of Japanese competition law, which
are discussed in Part IV.
As part of the economic reform, the interlocking control of Japanese industry
was broken.34 Specifically, the practice of exercising control through common
directorships and through mutual stock ownership was banned. 35 The zaibatsu,
which had grown from small, family-run business combines into massive holding
companies that controlled large segments of many industries, were forced to
divest their holdings in related industries.36
The push to model the Japanese economy after that of the United States led
to the passage in 1947 of the Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Maintenance Act.37
Although roughly forty other countries enforced some sort of competition
law, the Antimonopoly Act was the first Japanese law to deal with commercial
38competition.
Intended to promote competition in the Japanese economy while protecting
consumers, 39 the Antimonopoly Act, like many of the post-World War II laws,
was modeled after American antitrust laws. 4° As originally passed, the Antimo-
nopoly Act consisted of ten chapters, including 100 sections and fourteen supple-
mentary provisions, covering both the substantive and the procedural aspects of
the Antimonopoly Act. The Antimonopoly Act also contained organizational
provisions for the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), the agency created
to enforce the Act.41 Whereas American antitrust laws are expressed in vague
33. See IyoRI & UESUGI, supra note 3, at 13.
34. The Strategic Command of the Allied Powers (SCAP) Directive No. 244 of Nov. 6, 1945
required
[Sluch laws as will eliminate and prevent monopoly and restraint of trade, unreasonable
interlocking directorates, undesirable intercorporate security ownership and assure
the segregation of banking from commerce, industry and agriculture, and as will
provide equal opportunity to firms and individuals to compete in industry, commerce,
finance and agriculture on a democratic basis.
Id. at 16.
35. See MATSUSHITA, supra note 17, at 77.
36. See Michika Ariga, Antimonopoly Regulations in General, in 5 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN
at pt. 9, § 1.02 (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1996).
37. The Antimonopoly Act, Act No. 547 of 1947 [hereinafter Antimonopoly Act], became
effective on July 20, 1947. See IoRi & UESUGI, supra note 3, at 16. But see Kozo YAMAMURA,
JOINT RESEARCH AND ANTITRUST: JAPANESE vs. AMERICAN STRATEGIES 194 (Hugh Patrick ed.,
1986) (stating the Antimonopoly Act and the Fair Trade Commission were established in 1948).
38. See MATSUSHITA, supra note 17, at 75-76; see also ARIGA, supra note 36, at § 1.02.
39. Antimonopoly Act, supra note 37, art. 1 (1947).
40. See IyoRi & UESUGI, supra note 3, at 17.
41. Id.
SPRING 1999
82 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
and very broad terms,42 the Antimonopoly Act provides detailed regulations,
leaving no doubt what anticompetitive conduct it covers.43
The Antimonopoly Act contains three major prohibitions: private monopoliza-
tion, unreasonable restraint of trade, and unfair methods of competition." It also
includes prohibitions against other monopolistic practices such as mergers, which
have the capability of leading to monopolization, and reporting requirements that
force businesses to inform the JFTC of certain stock ownership arrangements,
international agreements, conflicts of director interest, concerted price increases,
and resale price agreements. 45 All of these provisions are intended to prevent
the formation of large concentrations of market power and to prevent the use of
market power in collusive ways.
As first passed into law, the Antimonopoly Act was considered by some to
be much stronger than comparable U.S. antitrust laws.46 The Act contained strict
prohibitions on cartels, monopolies, mergers, and even the existence of large
enterprises. 7 Businessmen, and even the headquarters of the Allied Occupation
Force, viewed the Act's very strict separation between companies-through pro-
hibitions on stock ownership by other companies and the limitation on the amount
of stock a financial corporation could hold in another company-as an excessive
restraint on the efforts to rebuild Japan's shattered post-war economy." The Diet
amended the Antimonopoly Act in 1949, even before the Allied occupation had
ended, to remove these prohibitions.' 9
Under the supervision of the Allied Occupation Force, the JFTC strictly en-
forced the Antimonopoly Act until about 1950.50 With the outbreak of the Korean
War, the focus of the allied powers shifted from reforming Japan to creating a
Japan that was economically strong enough to withstand the allure of commu-
nism. 5' With this shift in focus came a relaxation on the prohibitions of anticompet-
itive behavior. Thus, the behavior of the Allied forces at the outbreak of the
Korean War strongly parallels the behavior of the ruling powers at the beginning
of the Meiji era in that both adopted a strategy of immediate economic develop-
ment that encouraged, or in the case of the Allied powers at least allowed, the
formation and growth of cartels.
42. For example, the Sherman Act prohibits all "restraint[s] of trade." Sherman Act § 1, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Yet from the very early cases the courts have realized that this broad prohibition
is unworkable.
43. See IYomi & UESUGI, supra note 3, at 18.
44. See id. at 17.
45. See Ariga, supra note 36, § 1.03[3].
46. See id. § 1.02[2][a].
47. See MATSUSHITA, supra note 17, at 78.
48. See Ariga, supra note 36, § 1.02[2][a].
49. Among the changes made by the 1949 amendment were provisions that allowed companies
to own stock in other companies and allowed interlocking directorships as long as competition was
not substantially lessened.
50. See MATSUSHITA, supra note 17, at 79.
51. See id. This abrupt change in Allied policy is known as the "reverse course."
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The next amendment to the Antimonopoly Act was made in response to the
recession following the Korean War. The 1953 amendment removed the vertical
and horizontal restrictions on cooperation between businesses for the purpose of
controlling price, output, technology, and the development of additional produc-
tion capability. 52 The 1953 amendment also authorized cartels to be formed for
the purpose of improving industrial efficiency and to aid the recovery of depressed
industries.53
In 1958, further attempts by Japanese industry to amend the Antimonopoly
Act, which would have eased restrictions on cartels, failed to become law. The
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), however, fulfilled part of
the role of the banned cartels by instructing, during times of recession and over
the objections of the JFTC, industry representatives to reduce output by a uniform
amount, effectively imposing a cartel-like output restriction on industry while
preserving each participant's share in the market.54
The JFTC proposed another amendment to the Antimonopoly Act in 1976
that, because of opposition to the amendment from the business community,
failed to become law.55 This led to the passage of the 1977 amendment to the
Antimonopoly Act that strengthened the JFTC's ability to deal with monopolies
and cartels. 56 The 1977 amendment marked the first time an amendment strength-
ened the power of Japanese antimonopoly laws. The amendment was also unique
in that it granted powers to the JFTC that do not have any U.S. equivalents.
Specifically, the JFTC has the authority to demand an explanation and documented
support of price increases whenever it believes there may be cooperative behavior
57within an industry.
IV. Enforcement of Japanese Antimonopoly Laws
After the Allied occupation, the JFTC took over responsibility for the breakup
of the zaibatsu and illegal cartels. The breakup of large economic entities is
especially relevant to the globalization of the world's economies because some
economists claim the primary indicator of the ability to compete worldwide is
size.58 Strong national cartels, especially cartels with the authority or blessing
of the national government, are in many ways equivalent to a single large corpora-
tion. Since the breakup of the Japanese industrial blocks hinders their ability to
dominate world-wide markets, both business and government bureaucracy are
opposed to many of the antimonopoly enforcement actions. In addition, while
52. See Ariga, supra note 36, § 1.02[2][b].
53. See id. § 1.02[2][b]; see also MATSUSHITA, supra note 17, at 79-80.
54. See Ariga, supra note 36, § 1.02[2][c].
55. See id. § 1.02[2][d].
56. See MATSUSHITA, supra note 17, at 81-82; see also Ariga, supra note 36, § 1.02[2][e].
57. See MATSUSHITA, supra note 17, at 81-82.
58. See Walter Adams & James W. Brock, The "New Learning" and the Euthanasia of Antitrust,
74 CAL. L. REV. 1516, 1519 (1986).
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many Japanese people expressed anti-zaibatsu sentiments at the end of World
War H, in part because the zaibatsu had benefitted so much from wartime expan-
sion efforts, the public came to view the efforts to restrict the zaibatsu and
cartels after the war as Allied efforts to prevent the Japanese from competing
economically with the United States and the rest of the world.59
Despite continued efforts of the JFTC and continued calls by foreign businesses
for more enforcement, cartels still remain firmly entrenched in the Japanese
economy. 60 Part of the staying power of the cartels is due to the fact that collusive
behavior is part of a cultural tradition that dates back to the 1600s. 61 Regardless
of the cultural tendencies to accept collusive behavior, the JFTC has pledged to
eliminate cartels by 1999.62
A. THE JFTC LACKS THE POWER TO EFFECTIVELY ENFORCE THE
ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS
The fight to eliminate cartel-like behavior, which has been going on for at
least fifty years, will not be an easy one for the JFTC. Unlike the U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ), which enjoys the general support of the government and assis-
tance from the victims of antitrust violations who bring private actions against
the antitrust violators, the JFTC is in the fight alone.
1. There Is No Effective Right of Private Action in Japan
One reason for the lower level of enforcement of Japanese antimonopoly laws
compared to U.S. antitrust laws is the lack of an effective private right to sue.
Although the Japanese Antimonopoly Act, like U.S. antitrust laws, provides for
a private right to sue, the right has never resulted in an award of damages.63 In
addition to the lack of success, there are several other reasons why the private
cause of action is rarely invoked by plaintiffs. First, the Antimonopoly Act re-
quires the JFTC to take some formal action against the defendant before a private
individual can file suit. This requirement allows the JFTC to remove access to
the private action from the public simply by keeping a pending matter informal,
which the Commission prefers to do anyway. 64
Second, there is the perceived cultural aversion to litigation. Even assuming
the much-touted aversion does not exist, the Japanese government, through its
strict controls on entry into the legal field, has greatly limited Japanese access
to lawyers and to the court system.
59. Restrictive Trade Practices Study Team, Japan Productivity Center, Control of Restrictive
Trade Practices in Japan 8-9 (1958), quoted in HADLEY, supra note 1, at 11.
60. David Hamilton & Norihiko Shirouzu, Opening a Crack: Japan's Business Cartels Start to
Crumble, Slowly, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 1995, at 1.
61. Seeid.
62. See id.
63. See Harry First, Antitrust Enforcement in Japan, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 137, 148 (1995).
64. See id. at 147.
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Third, a plaintiff in a price-fixing action faces an extremely high burden of
proof. Specifically, the plaintiff must prove not only that prices rose during the
agreement, but also that the prices would not have risen without the agreement.65
Additionally, Japanese civil procedure provides only for very limited discovery,
further compounding the plaintiffs burden of proving an antitrust violation and
injury.
A fourth characteristic of the Japanese legal system that keeps judicial redress
out of the hands of most potential plaintiffs is the requirement of a filing fee
based on the damages claimed in the suit. In Japan, plaintiffs must pay a filing
fee equal to one percent of the damages sought. In price-fixing cases where the
damages can be extremely high, the fee may be impossible to raise, especially
since Japanese civil procedure does not allow class action suits.66 Should a plaintiff
eventually prevail and be awarded damages (and no damages have been awarded
so far), there is no treble damage provision as there is in the United States.
Finally, attorneys fees are not awarded and must be paid by the plaintiff.
2. The JFTC Lacks Power
Traditionally, the JFTC has not had the political support that it needs to
function as a truly independent enforcement agency. This lack of support was
evident from the resistance to the initial U.S. proposal for an independent
agency. 67 This resistance is due to the Japanese desire for powers of govern-
ment to be applied cooperatively by various entities and a fear that an indepen-
dent agency might countermand the economic policies being pursued by other
government bureaucracies.68
The Japanese bureaucratic structure is divided into many powerful cabinet-level
ministries. Two of the most powerful of the ministries are the Ministry of Finance,
which controls the budgets of the other ministries, and the Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry (MITI). Because the JFTC is not a cabinet-level minis-
try, it reports instead to the office of the prime minister. Because the JFTC's
purpose is to regulate industry, its goals often interfere with MITI's goals. Addi-
tionally, interference with Japan's exporters is likely to reduce the growth of the
Japanese economy, a prospect the Ministry of Finance dislikes. Therefore, both
MITI and the Ministry of Finance have a vested interest in limiting the power
of the JFTC.
Not only do other ministries have an interest in limiting the power of the JFTC,
but the power the JFTC does exert is indirectly controlled by the ministries
through loyalties of the JFTC's top management. The current chairman of the
65. See id. at 147-48 (citing the Tsuruoka Oil Case and the Tokyo Oil Case).
66. See J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs ofthe Consensual Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and Institu-
tional Barriers to Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 604, 631 (1985).
67. See First, supra note 63, at 144.
68. See id.
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JFTC, Masami Kogayu, is a former vice-minister of the Ministry of Finance.
Of the four other top commissioners, one is from the Ministry of Finance and
one is from MITI.69 The selection of the top management from outside the ranks
of the JFTC not only allows other ministers to exert control over the JFTC, but
it also reduces the possibilities for advancement within the JFTC, lowering the
value of a career there.
In addition to other ministries dominating actions of the JFTC, Japanese politi-
cians also restrict the JFTC's actions. The Liberal Democratic Party has used
the statutory cartel authorization laws to sell exemptions from the antimonopoly
laws in exchange for political contributions.7 ° Politicians also accept large cam-
paign donations from the keiretsu in exchange for political favors.7
3. The Japanese Court System is Extremely Deferential to the Diet
Japanese courts have traditionally refused to interfere with anticompetitive
industrial behavior, especially when the behavior has received governmental
sanction. The deference given governmental action has often been based on the
constitutional authority of the government to promote the public good. Some
commentators argue that before the United States preempted Japanese develop-
ment of antimonopoly laws by forcing a version of the U.S. law upon them,
Japanese courts were starting to follow German antimonopoly policy and Japan
would have developed antimonopoly laws similar to European laws.72
4. Japanese Industry Can Avoid Some of the Enforcement Actions
Even when the JFTC is successful in stopping the collusive actions of a cartel,
the cartel members may simply agree to merge, thereby creating the price-fixing
effects of a cartel without exposure to the JFTC's fines.73 Some of the resistance
to antimonopoly laws may stem from the fact that the behavior prohibited by
the laws is often efficient behavior that could increase the global competitiveness
of the business being restricted. Perhaps as a result of its lack of enforcement
power, the JFTC has also often refused to view anything but very clear-cut
violations as actionable under the antimonopoly statutes. 74
69. See David P. Hamilton & Wendy Bounds, Japan's Review May Move Issue Off Camera,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1996, at 1.
70. See Harry First, Selling Antitrust in Japan, 7-SPG ANTITRUST 34, 36 (1993).
71. See Measure Is Introduced To Establish U.S. -Japan Antitrust Study Commission, 64 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 437, 438 (1993).
72. See Iyoiu & UESUGI, supra note 3, at 11.
73. See Hamilton & Shirouzu, supra note 60, at 1 (describing the after-effects of efforts to break
up Japan's cement cartels).
74. See Kozo Yamamura, Joint Research and Antitrust: Japanese vs. American Strategies, JA-
PAN'S HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES: LESSONS AND LIMITATIONS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 196 (Hugh
Patrick ed., 1986).
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B. SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTIONS BY THE JFTC LACK DETERRENT EFFECT
Even when the JFTC succeeds in prosecuting a violation of the Antimonopoly
Law, most commentators believe the traditional penalties imposed rarely serve
a deterrent effect. In 1991 the Diet did raise the administrative fine from 1.5
percent to 6 percent, but even this increased amount is only slightly more than
half of what the U.S. Sentencing Commission imposes for the average price-fixing
overcharge.75 Not only are Japanese administrative fines considered insufficient
by U.S. standards, but many of the Japanese investigations result merely in
warnings to violators.76 The preference for issuing warnings is not necessarily
a sign of weakness by the JFTC, any more than it is a continuation of the Japanese
tendency to view government as a benevolent master who would rather urge an
offender to reform than to punish him.
The criminal sanctions available under Japanese law are rarely exercised by
the JFTC. The JFTC did bring successful criminal charges against the major
Japanese oil companies and their officers as a result of price fixing in the kerosene
market. The Supreme Court upheld these convictions in 1984. 77
C. ARGUMENTS THAT JAPAN'S ANTIMONOPOLY LAW IS ENFORCED
Although most commentators and certainly most U.S. businesses argue that
the Japanese have not effectively enforced their Antimonopoly Acts, the Japanese
government and some American commentators believe that the JFTC does enforce
Japanese law at least as well as U.S. laws are enforced. These commentators
cite the fact that the total civil fines imposed by the JFTC increased from 420
million yen in 1989 to 12.6 billion yen in 1991.'8 At an exchange rate of 125
yen to the dollar, the 1991 fines are more than $100 million, over four times
the $23 million in fines collected by the U.S. DOJ from antitrust cases in the
same time period. 79
With the continuing increase in the United States' trade deficit, U.S. businesses
and politicians have increased their calls for tougher Japanese enforcement of
the Antimonopoly Act. The U.S. DOJ has also sought to enforce U.S. antitrust
laws against Japanese companies for actions in Japan that have an effect on U.S.
markets.Ws Just as the United States' enforcement of its antitrust laws increased
during the 1990s, Japan has also seen a rise in the level of enforcement of the
Japanese antimonopoly laws in recent years. Because many cartels were estab-
lished to prevent excessive competition, in 1994 the JFTC announced a plan to
75. See First, supra note 70, at 36.
76. See JFTC Admonishes Osaka Wholesaler for its Illegal Business Conduct, 59 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 94 (1990).
77. See Ramseyer, supra note 66, at 619-20.
78. See First, supra note 70, at 36.
79. See id.
80. See infra Part VI.
SPRING 1999
88 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
eliminate authorized industry cartels that are seen as contrary to the spirit of the
Antimonopoly Act.81 In 1995, the JFTC also issued a record number of surcharge
payment orders.8 2
V. U.S. Antitrust Laws
The United States was the first nation to aggressively enforce competition
laws. 83 The United States' strong advocacy of antitrust laws follows the warning
of Adam Smith: "People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for
merriment and diversion, but that the conversation ends in a conspiracy against
the public or in some contrivance to raise prices. "4 The foundation of the United
States' antitrust laws, and thus the basis for the Japanese version of the American
laws, was established in the United States through enactment of the Sherman
Act, the Clayton Act, and the Robinson-Patman Act.
85
The Sherman Act deals with the allocation of market power among busi-
nesses. Section two of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization. 86 Although
not expressed in the statute, section two has been interpreted as requiring
intent to monopolize, or affirmative actions taken with the purpose or effect
of monopolization, before criminal sanctions can apply. 87 Section one of the
Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade....8 Violations of section one can be criminal offenses
with a maximum corporate fine of one million dollars and the potential of
three years imprisonment.
8 9
The Clayton Act prohibits many business practices that are deemed to be
unreasonably unfair, including discriminatory pricing, tying arrangements, resale
price maintenance agreements, and some exclusive dealing arrangements.9' Per-
haps the most important provision of the U.S. antitrust laws is section four of
the Clayton Act, which provides for a private treble damage remedy for injuries
caused by "anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." 9 ' By providing for a private
remedy, the U.S. antitrust laws enable anyone harmed by violation of the antitrust
81. See JFTC Takes First Steps To Scuttle Authorized Cartels In Certain Sectors, 66 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 549 (1994).
82. See 70 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 398 (1996). The twenty-four violations resulted
in a total of $60.8 million in fines levied against 741 firms. See id. Additionally, one violation was
passed from the JFTC to the Ministry of Justice for investigation of criminal charges in 1995.
83. See MATSUSHITA, supra note 17, at 75.
84. See ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 117 (Everyman's ed. 1910).
85. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1994).
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
87. But no such intent is required for civil violations of section 2 of the Sherman Act. See, e.g.,
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
89. See id. The maximum individual fine is $350,000.
90. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-26 (1994).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
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laws to bring suit. 92 The enablement of private actions to enforce antitrust viola-
tions has effectively multiplied the size of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. DOJ
because each market participant has a very real incentive to detect and prevent
antitrust violations and can act as a "private attorney general." The treble dam-
ages portion of the private action, while dramatically increasing the incentive
for private suits, is typically viewed as too harsh by other nations. As discussed
infra in Part VI.E.5, the treble damages provisions have caused other nations
to refuse to cooperate in U.S. investigations of international corporations and
have also prompted other nations to pass blocking statutes or "claw-back" statutes
designed to prevent the imposition of treble damage awards on their domestic
businesses.
VI. Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Antitrust Laws
"The basic antitrust statutes of the United States, such as the Sherman Act,
the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act, provide some form of
jurisdiction over international commerce. 93 The United States, whether through
the DOJ, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), or private party actions, has
not shown a great deal of restraint in asserting jurisdiction over foreign defendants
whose activities have caused an adverse impact on U.S. commerce. 94 The antitrust
laws reach not only conduct and transactions that occur within U.S. boundaries,
but also anticompetitive conduct that affects U.S. domestic or foreign commerce
"regardless of where such conduct occurs or the nationality of the parties
involved." 95
The aggressive stance taken by the United States against foreign defendants
has long been a source of consternation for foreign governments and foreign
corporations alike.96 While the U.S. government expressly states otherwise, many
believe that a recent resurgence in antitrust enforcement is aimed directly at
Japanese corporations and their business practices, which are condoned by the
Japanese government. 97
92. Judicial interpretation of the statute has limited plaintiffs to direct purchasers from a violator.
Therefore consumers purchasing from a retailer who purchased from a wholesale cartel cannot bring
suit, even if they can show the retailer passed the higher prices on to the consumers.
93. Seung W. Chang, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws to Other Countries:
Proposed Bilateral Agreements for Resolving International Conflicts Within the Pacific Community,
16 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 295 (1993) (citations omitted).
94. See Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: A Postscript on
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 34 VA. J. INT'L. L. 213, 214 (1993).
95. U.S. Dept. Just. & Fed'l Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations § 3.1 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Guidelines].
96. See, e.g., JFTC Chairman Expresses Opposition to Cross-Border Antitrust Enforcement, 69
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 458, 458 (Oct. 19, 1995); Tokyo Official Slams U.S. Antitrust
Stance, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 1992, at A4.
97. See Joe Davidson, Minimal Action Against Foreigners Expected in Antitrust Crackdown,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 1992, at A2.
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There are several different conditions that must be met for a court to assert
jurisdiction over a party: (1) venue; (2) service of process; (3) personal jurisdic-
tion; and (4) subject matter jurisdiction. Although these concepts are interrelated,
and are often treated together by courts, each is a separate requirement. If any
one of these criteria is deficient, then a court has not obtained or will refuse to
obtain jurisdiction, and the opposing party must find relief elsewhere, if at all. In
addition, there are several defenses and exceptions available to foreign defendants
against an assertion ofjurisdiction, including: (1) act of state; (2) foreign sovereign
compulsion; (3) foreign sovereign immunity; (4) sovereign petition; and (5) for-
eign blocking statutes.
A. VENUE
Venue determines whether a court in a particular forum is authorized to hear
a case. 9 Venue provisions are interpreted liberally and expansively by the
courts. 99 The general federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391,100 can provide a
basis for venue for antitrust actions against foreign defendants.' 01 Section 1391(d)
provides that "an alien may be sued in any district,"' ' and has been cited in
rejecting claims of improper venue asserted by foreign defendants.'03 In fact, the
Supreme Court has stated that section 1391(d) "is properly regarded, not as a
venue restriction at all, but rather as a declaration of the long established rule
that suits against aliens are wholly outside the operation of all the federal venue
laws, general and specific. "10
4
Sections four and twelve of the Clayton Act set out the special antitrust venue
provisions applicable to both domestic and foreign defendants.0 5 For any type of
defendant-individuals and unincorporated or incorporated entities-section four
permits private damage actions in any "district in which the defendant resides or
is found or has an agent."06 For defendant corporations, section twelve authorizes
an antitrust proceeding "not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant,
but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business."-17
The primary difference between sections four and twelve, as far as corporations
are concerned, is the use of the words "agent" and "transacts business," respec-
tively.' 08 In practice, the difference is usually negligible because most courts
98. See WILBUR L. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS § 3.1 (4th ed.
1991).
99. E.g., Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., Ltd., 885 F.2d 1406, 1409-10 (9th Cir. 1989).
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1994).
101. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS § 10.C. I (3d ed. 1992).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1994).
103. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 101, § 10.C.1 & n.102-03 (citing cases).
104. See Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, 714 (1973).
105. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 22 (1994).
106. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1994).
108. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 22 (1994).
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utilize section twelve for corporations, and find that the presence of an agent is
evidence that the corporation is transacting business under section twelve.'°9
Of the various clauses, the "transacts business" clause provides the most
expansive basis for venue." 0 A court will sustain jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation if the corporation is carrying on business of any substantial character
in the district, even though such activity is through a U.S. subsidiary."' Courts
look at a myriad of factors in determining whether a corporation "transacts
business" in a particular district, including: (1) continuous and substantial activi-
ties; (2) formation of contracts; (3) agency aspects of a related or unrelated entity;
(4) sales volume; (5) patent licensing activities; (6) business solicitation;
(7) presence of employees; (8) purchases; (9) advertising; and (10) business
visitation by officers and executives.2
Sections four and twelve of the Clayton Act supplement, rather than preempt,
the general federal venue laws." 3 In Go-Video v. Akai, Go-Video alleged under
section one of the Sherman Act that four Japanese firms and one Korean firm
conspired to prevent it from marketing a dual-deck video cassette recorder
(VCR)'4 in the United States and alleged venue under the general federal statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1391(d). The defendants alleged that Go-Video must affirmatively
meet the venue provisions of section twelve of the Clayton Act in order to entertain
a suit, instead of merely relying on the general federal statutes. Finding no evi-
dence that Congress intended section twelve to be exclusive or to narrow the
scope of antitrust venue, the Ninth Circuit held that venue could be obtained
through either the general federal venue statute or the specific antitrust venue
statute. "'5
Thus, venue is typically not a difficult requirement for a plaintiff to meet for
a foreign corporate defendant, especially in light of the international character
of most major corporations. Foreign defendants usually must look to other juris-
dictional requirements in order to avoid a U.S. lawsuit.
B. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Service of process requires a communication to the defendant "reasonably
calculated to notify him of the proceeding and afford him the opportunity to be
109. See, e.g., Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 55 F.R.D. 519, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
110. United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795, 807 (1948).
111. See id. (applying test derived for domestic corporations, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern
Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927), to foreign corporation).
112. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 101, § 1O.C.1 & n.85-95 (citing cases).
113. Go-Video, 885 F.2d at 1409-10.
114. Dual-deck VCRs allow a viewer to watch one tape while recording on another from a television
signal, and also to easily copy from one tape to another. CA 9 Upholds Dismissal of New Claims
by Maker of Videocassette Recorders, 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 779, 779 (Dec. 23,
1993).
115. Go-Video, 885 F.2d at 1413.
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heard." 116 Section twelve of the Clayton Act, in addition to authorizing venue,
governs service of process in an antitrust proceeding against a corporation."'
Section twelve provides that process on a corporation, domestic or foreign, "may
be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be
found." "1
For foreign corporations, then, service of notice is proper not only at their U.S.
facilities, but also at facilities abroad. "9 For example, in Go- Video v. Akai, service
of the Japanese and Korean defendant corporations120 in their home jurisdictions
was deemed proper by the Ninth Circuit. 121 In addition, the court stated that service
under section twelve is valid whether venue is established under section twelve,
or under other venue statutes, such as the general federal venue statute. 122 It appears,
therefore, that service of notice provisions will be liberally applied for foreign cor-
porations. On the other hand, some commentators state that Go- Video may be inter-
preted to suggest that service of process under section twelve is limited to cases
where venue can be established under an appropriate statute. 123
Rule four of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs service of
process on foreign individuals and non-corporate entities 24 and also how foreign
corporations may be served.12 Rule 4(f) provides for service "by any internation-
ally agreed means reasonably calculated to give notice," such as under the Hague
Convention, or according to methods approved by the foreign country, or ac-
cording to means directed by the court that do not violate any international
agreement.126 In particular, rule 4(f) allows delivery to an individual personally,
or by registered mail if permitted by the foreign country. 2 7 Rule 4(h), for corpora-
tions, follows rule 4(f) except for delivery to an individual personally. 2
Because Japan prohibits registered mail service, and objects to certain provi-
sions of the Hague Convention relating to service, at least one court has held
that service by registered mail to Japan is not sufficient. 2 9 Japan's actions indicate
its "desire that all service within Japan be obtained by means of the central
116. Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219 (D.N.J. 1945).
117. See 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1994).
118. Id.
119. WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 8.02 (1996); see, e.g., Go-Video, 885
F.2d at 1413.
120. The corporations were Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Sanyo Electric Co, Ltd.,
Sharp Corporation, Victor Company of Japan, Ltd., and Samsung Electronics Co.
121. Go-Video, 885 F.2d at 1413.
122. See id.
123. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 101, § 10.C. 1 n. 138 (citing in addition other cases
supporting this interpretation).
124. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (1993).
125. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(h).
126. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
127. See id.
128. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(h); see FUGATE, supra note 98, § 3.7 (4th ed. Supp. 1995).
129. See Pennebaker v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 155 F.R.D. 153 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
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Japanese authority." 3 ° Of course, this is typical of the bureaucracy's strategy
in Japan to maintain control over events by becoming an integral and necessary
part of them. It is very possible that by closely controlling the serving process,
the decision-makers in Japan can influence the substantive results of the overall
lawsuit. For example, they may deny service altogether, or simply delay it so
long that the issue becomes moot.
C. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In addition to venue and service of process, a U.S. court must also find personal
jurisdiction over a party in order to assert judicial power and bind the party by
the court's adjudication. 31 Antitrust actions do not have any special rules of
personal jurisdiction,112 so the standard federal three-part test applies here as in
other areas of the law.
The first question is whether there is a federal or state long-arm statute authoriz-
ing such jurisdiction.3 The second and third components of the test ensure
compliance with constitutional due process under the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution.'34 The second question is whether the defendant has established
minimum contacts with the forum by purposefully availing himself of the privilege
of conducting activities there 35 "such that he should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there.- 136 The third question is whether maintenance of the
suit, and forcing the defendant to appear and prepare a defense, comports with
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice., 137 In answering this
question, the court should examine "the burden on the defendant, the interests
of the forum state, and the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief.' 3 . Further,
the court should look to where the controversy can most efficiently be resolved,
and, for international cases, "consider the procedural and substantive policies
of other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction." 3 9
The jurisdictional analysis for evaluating due process is very similar to
the "transacts business" test for venue under section twelve of the Clayton
130. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, ANNUAL REVIEW OF 1994 ANTITRUST
LAW DEVELOPMENTS § 10.C (1995).
131. See FUGATE, supra note 98, § 3.7 (4th ed. 1991) (quoting Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson
Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219 (D.N.J. 1945)).
132. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 101, § 10.C.2.
133. See Go-Video, 885 F.2d at 1413.
134. U.S. CONST. Amend. V. (stating that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law").
135. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).
136. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
137. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
138. Asahi Metal Ind. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (plurality opinion).
Although the justices split on whether minimum contacts were established, all of the justices agreed
that allowing a Taiwanese citizen to bring suit in California against a Japanese corporation would
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See id.
139. Id. at 115.
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Act.'4o The relevant factors include: (1) nature and substantiality of the defendant's
contacts; (2) the connection between the contacts and the cause of action; (3)
availability of other forums; (4) reasonable anticipation that the defendant's ac-
tions would affect the forum; (5) whether the method of service informed the
defendant of the nature of the proceeding; 141 (6) subsidiary activities; (7) local
telephone listings; (8) director's meetings, business correspondence, or financial
transactions; and (9) conspiratorial meetings in the district."2
The DOJ and the FTC affirmatively state that they "will bring suit only if
they conclude that personal jurisdiction exists under the due process clause of
the U.S. Constitution,'1 43 as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court. Thus, the
DOJ and the FTC should be expected to carry out the above analysis before
bringing an action against a foreign defendant.
The final personal jurisdictional issue for foreign defendants is exactly where
the "minimum contacts" are to be measured. The Supreme Court in Asahi Metal
Industries Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal. left the question open as to whether minimal
national contacts rather than district contacts are sufficient for personal jurisdic-
tion. ' In antitrust actions, the majority of courts require sufficient contacts in
the specific district,' 45 while some courts consider national contacts as part of
the general principles of fair play and substantial justice."
A substantial minority of courts in antitrust actions consider national contacts,
or aggregate contacts, in the United States as a whole sufficient for personal
jurisdiction. 147 For example, in Go-Video, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
worldwide service provision of section twelve of the Clayton Act potentially
permits "personal jurisdiction [to] be established in any district, given the exis-
tence of sufficient national contacts." 48 The court went on to conclude that
asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant Japanese and Korean companies
complied with the due process components of the test. 149
The new U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tend to support the national
contacts viewpoint, and seem to be an attempt to change the majority rule.150
Rule 4(k) contains a new federal long-arm provision, providing that:
If the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service is also effective, with respect
to claims arising under federal law, to establish personal jurisdiction over the person
140. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 101, § 10.C.2.
141. See HOLMES, supra note 119, § 8.02 (citing cases).
142. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 101, § 10.C.2 (citing cases).
143. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 95, § 4.1.
144. Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 113.
145. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 101, § 10.C.2 (citing cases).
146. See id. (citing cases).
147. See id. (citing cases).
148. Go-Video, 885 F.2d at 1415.
149. See id. at 1416-17.
150. See FUGATE, supra note 98, § 3.7 (4th ed. Supp. 1995).
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of any defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction
of any state. 15'
Therefore, the broader national contacts rule announced in Go-Video appears to
be the proper test for asserting personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant in
an antitrust action. As with venue and service of process, obtaining personal
jurisdiction over a Japanese corporate defendant is not an overly difficult task,
at least as far as the U.S. courts are concerned. Of these three requirements, the
Japanese control over the service of process probably presents the toughest obsta-
cle to obtaining jurisdiction.
D. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Venue, service of process, and personal jurisdiction primarily relate to the
procedures for bringing a cause of action, and attempt to guarantee the fairness
of that action. Subject matter jurisdiction, by contrast, refers to the power of a
court to adjudicate the general class of cases to which a specific case belongs.
In other words, subject matter jurisdiction prescribes the types of cases that a
court is permitted to hear. According to the U.S. Constitution, U.S. federal courts
are of limited jurisdiction instead of general jurisdiction, and they may hear only
those cases that involve a federal question or diversity of citizenship. '52 Therefore,
the extent of subject matter jurisdiction for antitrust actions is dictated by the
antitrust statutes passed by Congress, as interpreted by the courts.
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress broad power "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign nations."' 53 Passed under the authority of this power, the Sherman
Act is the primary U.S. antitrust statute.154 Section one of the Sherman Act applies
to any conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce "with foreign nations."55
Similarly, section two applies to any person who shall monopolize, or attempt
or conspire to monopolize, trade or commerce "with foreign nations." 56 Al_
though these statutes are representative, other antitrust statutes address slightly
different subject matter.' 57 Since at least 1945, these provisions have been given
151. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k).
152. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
154. Marina Lao, Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: Yokosuka and Yokota, and
"Footnote 159" Scenarios, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 821, 825 (1994).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). But see Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C.
§ 6(a) (1994) (adding additional limitations to Sherman Act jurisdiction for non-import commerce).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). But see Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C.
§ 6(a) (1994) (adding additional limitations to Sherman Act jurisdiction for non-import commerce).
157. See Clayton Act §§ 1-7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-18 (1994) (applies to specific practices, such as
price discrimination, involving commerce "with foreign nations. "); see also Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act §§ 4, 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 44, 45(a)(1) (1994) (applies to unfair methods of competition
in or affecting commerce "with foreign nations."). But see Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3) (1994) (adding additional limitations to FTC Act jurisdiction for
non-import commerce).
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expansive coverage, 158 even to the extent of reaching activities that occur solely
abroad, as long as there is some cognizable injury to U.S. commerce.159
The history of subject matter jurisdiction in antitrust cases is a long and involved
one; over the years the courts have articulated various tests that approach the
problem in different ways.'6 Currently, the reach of subject matter jurisdiction
over foreign commerce can basically be classified into two different categories
depending on whether the specific commerce is (1) U.S. import trade or (2) U.S.
export trade and extraterritorial trade. 16'
In the first category, U.S. import trade, there is no express statutory require-
ment, but the U.S. Supreme Court has recently upheld the traditional "effects"
doctrine developed by the courts. Thus, for U.S. import trade, "[t]he Sherman
Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact produce
some substantial effect in the United States."1 62 The "effects" test is currently
fairly well recognized by other countries, and tests similar to it have actually
been adopted by other countries. 163 Application of the test is straightforward
because imports by definition affect U.S. domestic commerce directly, and a
court need only determine if the "effects" are substantial. 64
In the second category, U.S. export trade and extraterritorial trade (i.e., non-
import trade), the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA)
governs.165 For foreign conduct involving non-import trade, the statute requires
a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on (1) U.S. domestic
commerce, (2) U.S. import trade, or (3) export trade of a person engaged in
such trade in the United States. 66 The FTAIA clearly states "that trade between
third countries is not covered by the Sherman Act' ' 167 and appears to state that
158. The seminal case is United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945). The case is interpreted as having Supreme Court precedence value, because it was certified
to the Second Circuit for lack of a quorum of disinterested Supreme Court justices.
159. See HOLMES, supra note 119, § 8.01(1).
160. See, e.g., Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982),
vacated on other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549
F.2d 597 (1976); FUGATE, supra note 98, §§ 2.7-2.13 (4th ed. 1991 & Supp. 1995).
161. See 1995 Guidelines, supra note 95, § 3.1.
162. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993). While Hartford Fire dealt with
a civil antitrust action, the First Circuit in 1997 struck new ground by extending the Court's reasoning
to criminal antitrust actions as well. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4, 9
(1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 685 (1998) (holding that price-fixing activities which take place
entirely in another country are prosecutable under section 1 of the Sherman Act if they were intended
to have, and did in fact have, a substantial effect in the United States).
163. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 95, § 3.1 n.51.
164. See id. § 3.11; cf. Mitsui, 671 F.2d at 883-84.
165. Sherman Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1994).
166. Sherman Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1994). If the Act applies only because of the third
prong, then the Act applies "to such conduct only for injury to export business in the United States."
Sherman Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1994).
167. FUGATE, supra note 98, § 2.15 (4th ed. 1991).
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injury to foreigners in a foreign country due to restrictions on U.S. export trade
is insufficient for jurisdiction. 168
The DOJ and the FTC subscribe to this two-way classification of actions based
on trade type, and state in the 1995 Guidelines that they will apply the "effects"
test to import trade and the FTAIA to non-import trade.1 69
In several cases against Japanese defendants, courts have found subject matter
jurisdiction even though the conduct involved took place on foreign soil and
affected only U.S. export trade. Other actions have been settled by Japanese
defendants even though their conduct arguably affected only extraterritorial
trade.1 70 For example, in one private antitrust action, Daishowa International v.
North Coast Export Co., 171 an association of U.S. wood chip exporters alleged
that a group of Japanese wood chip importers had engaged in market allocation,
price fixing, and boycotting. The case was decided before the FTAIA took effect,
but the court still found subject matter jurisdiction because the alleged conduct,
done solely by Japanese nationals on Japanese soil, affected U.S. export and
domestic commerce. 
172
In another proceeding resolved before the FTAIA came into effect, United
States v. C. Itoh & Co., Ltd,173 the DOJ alleged that a group of Japanese shellfish
buyers had engaged in price fixing of tanner crab purchased from U.S. exporters
in Alaska. Here again, subject matter jurisdiction was found over conduct on
foreign soil by a foreign cartel which affected U.S. export commerce.
174
On the other hand, the activities of foreign actors are sometimes truly too remote
to support subject matter jurisdiction. For example, in a patent infringement suit,
Papst Motorem GMbH & Co., KG v. Kanematsu-Goshu (U.S.A.) Inc. ," one
168. See id.
169. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 95, § 3.1.
170. See Lao, supra note 154, at 822-23, 859-62. Professor Lao describes and analyzes in detail
two cases involving bid-rigging by 140 Japanese construction firms for contracts at a U.S. naval
base in Yokosuka, Japan and for a U.S. air base in Yokoa, Japan. See id. The cases were eventually
settled for about $70 million dollars, so the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was not reached. See
id. at 848-49. Professor Lao concludes that a foreign horizontal bid-rigging scheme by itself would
normally be advantageous for U.S. competitors, so the effect on export test could be difficult to
satisfy. See id. at 860-61.
171. See Daishowa Int'l v. North Coast Export Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,774 (N.D.
Cal. 1982) (resolved by consent decree).
172. See id. at 71, 788-90 (applying Timberlane jurisdictional test, and granting preliminary
injunction). The court also held that there were no comity problems because there was no conflict
with Japanese law, harm to the Japanese economy and Japanese retaliation were merely speculative,
and there may not be any remedy available under Japanese law. See id.
173. See United States v. C. Itoh & Co. Ltd., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,010 (W.D. Wash.
1982).
174. See id.; Robert D. Shank, The Justice Department's Recent Antitrust Enforcement Policy:
Toward a "Positive Comity" Solution to International Competition Problems?, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 155, 167-68 (1996).
175. See GMbH & Co., KG v. Kanematsu-Goshu (U.S.A.) Inc., 629 F. Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
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of the defendant Japanese companies, Shinano Tokki Corp. (STC), coun-
terclaimed that Papst, a German company, was asserting the patents in bad faith
and thus violating antitrust laws by attempting to monopolize. To establish an
effect on U.S. commerce, STC alleged that Papst caused it to lose sales of its
motors to another Japanese company in Japan, which then would have resold
the products to a U.S. subsidiary for sale in the United States. The court held
that the effects of the "alleged antitrust activities occurred solely in Japan where
STC sells the motors." 17 6 Any effect in the United States would be, at most,
de minimis, so the court dismissed the counterclaim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 177
The subject matter of the FTAIA, foreign conduct involving U.S. export trade
and extraterritorial trade, typically has a less visibly direct effect on U.S. commerce
than that of conduct affecting import trade. Other countries, somewhat understand-
ably, have decried the reach of the FTAIA, even though it was actually passed as
a limit to jurisdiction to give added protection to U.S. export trade. The broad inter-
pretation of U.S. subject matter jurisdiction for conduct in other countries is one
of the primary reasons for the high degree of apprehension by foreign governments
toward U.S. antitrust laws. 17 8 Of course, it is the power of the U.S. antitrust laws,
coupled with their reach, that concerns foreign governments and foreign corpora-
tions. 179 For one thing, the United States has been much more rigorous in enforcing
its laws than other countries. In addition, the U.S. antitrust laws are stronger than
those of many other countries in several ways: (1) actions may be brought, not
only by the government, but also by private parties harmed by the alleged wrongful
conduct; (2) private causes of action may collect treble damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) conduct and structural (dissolution or divestiture) injunctive relief are available;
and (4) criminal prosecution is available.
A fairly recent change in the DOJ and the FTC Guidelines aptly illustrates
the worldwide uproar that can occur over a modification in the U.S. antitrust
laws or their intended application. In 1992, the DOJ and the FTC rescinded
footnote 159 from the Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Opera-
tions that had been in effect since 1988.'80 Added during the Reagan era of relaxed
antitrust enforcement, footnote 159 stated:
176. Id. at 869.
177. See id.
178. See, e.g., HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY § 14.11
(1996).
179. A prime example is the recent criminal prosecution of Archer-Daniels-Midland (ADM), two
Japanese companies, a Korean company, and some of their managers, for conspiring to fix the price
of lysine (a chicken and hog growth promoter) in violation of the U.S. antitrust laws. Thomas M.
Burton et al., Corn Plot: Global Conspiracy Believed in Archer-Daniels Case, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
July 31, 1995, at Al. While the fines for the Japanese companies ($10 million each) are substantially
less than the $100 million fine against ADM, they are still much greater than the recently-raised
maximum of $800,000 allowed under Japanese antitrust law.
180. See James F. Rill, Competition Policy: A Force for Open Markets, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 637,
648-49 (1993).
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Although the FTAIA extends jurisdiction under the Sherman Act to conduct that has
a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on the export trade or export
commerce of a person engaged in such commerce in the United States, the Department
is concerned only with adverse effects on competition that would harm U.S. consumers
by reducing output or raising prices."'
The reason given for the change in policy was to permit enforcement of the
antitrust laws against foreign conduct that harms U.S. exports when the conduct
would have been a violation if it had occurred in the United States.' 82 For example,
if two foreign manufacturers with monopoly power in a foreign country conspire
to prevent a competing U.S. manufacturer from entering the market in that coun-
try, this would "clearly have a direct and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S.
export commerce, since it is aimed at a U.S. exporter.'
' 83
Needless to say, the new policy met with great controversy internationally.' 84
While the DOJ insisted that the policy is general in nature and not directed toward
any particular businesses or countries, some felt that the new policy was aimed
at Japan and Japanese companies.'85 Japan called the new policy a violation of
national sovereignty and strongly protested from every angle. Japanese Foreign
Ministry spokesman, Masamichi Hanabusa, stated that Japan opposes the extrater-
ritorial application of foreign laws,' 86 while then-Chairman of the Japanese Fed-
eral Trade Commission, Setsuo Umezawa, declared that vigorous U.S. enforce-
ment could obstruct economic relations and damage trust between the United
States and Japan. 8 7 The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) threatened to adopt a blocking statute to counter the U.S. policy. 88
The United States countered by claiming that the new policy would actually
avoid trade wars through regular interchange between the two countries based
on rule of law, and went ahead and implemented the new policy.' 89 On a practical
note, other countries may not need to be as concerned as they have been; only
thirty to forty cases were instigated under the policy before 1988,'90 and only a
couple have been brought since 1992.'91 However, the policy can still be seen
as an affront to national sovereignty, and Japan continues to protest cross-border
181. U.S. Dept. Just. & Fed'l Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations § 4.1 n. 159 (1988), reprinted in 67 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391 (Nov.
17, 1988) (special supp.) [hereinafter 1988 Guidelines].
182. See FUGATE, supra note 98, § 2.19 (4th ed. supp. 1995) (citing DOJ press release).
183. See 1995 Guidelines, supra note 95, § 3.122 (illustrative example D).
184. See Shank, supra note 174, at 166.
185. See FUGATE, supra note 98, § 2.19 (4th ed. supp. 1995).
186. See Urban C. Lehner & Christopher J. Chipello, Japanese Press U.S. to Explain Antitrust
Policy, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1992, at A3.
187. See Christopher J. Chipello, Japanese Ministry May Try to Blunt a Broadening of U.S.
Antitrust Laws, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1992, at A3.
188. See Tokyo Official Slams U.S. Antitrust Stance, supra note 96, at A4.
189. See U.S. Stays Firm on Antitrust Stance, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1992, at A2.
190. See id.
191. See Shank, supra note 174, at 168-71.
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enforcement of U.S. antitrust law. 92 This is to be expected considering the Japa-
nese aversion to formal adjudication, and the attendant lack of control that accom-
panies it. The uncertainties of litigation, especially in a foreign forum, serve to
substantially inhibit the Japanese government from resolving problems in its
preferred manner consistent with current social policy.
E. DEFENSEs/EXCEPTIONS TO JURISDICTION
Even if subject matter jurisdiction is permitted, a foreign defendant may
still avoid jurisdiction by asserting one of a variety of defenses: (1) act of
state; (2) foreign sovereign compulsion; (3) foreign sovereign immunity;
(4) sovereign petition;and (5) foreign blocking statutes. 193 However, each de-
fense has significant limitations and typically will not free a defendant from
jurisdiction.
1. Act of State Doctrine
The first defense, the act of state doctrine, is based on the principles of comity
and separation of powers. International comity "reflects the broad concept of
respect among co-equal sovereign nations and plays a role in determining the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive
or judicial acts of another nation. 194
In W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. Inc. v. Environmental Techtonics Corp., Int'l, the
U.S. Supreme Court limited the act of state doctrine, stating that it "does not
establish an exception for cases and controversies that may embarrass foreign
governments, but merely requires that, in the process of deciding, the acts of
foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid." 195
Stated another way, the act of state defense may only be raised when the court
must decide the effect of official action by a foreign sovereign. 96
Three years after Kirkpatrick, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,
the Supreme Court appeared to back off from that stance slightly. '9' The Court
first noted that Congress, in limiting jurisdiction with the FTAIA, expressed no
view on the question of whether a court may decline jurisdiction on the basis of
comity. 198 The facts in Hartford Fire did not require the Court to address that
192. See JFTC Chairman Expresses Opposition to Cross-Border Antitrust Enforcement, supra
note 96, at 458.
193. The doctrine of forum non conveniens is another defense, but the Supreme Court has held
that it is inapplicable to a suit brought under the U.S. antitrust laws. See United States v. Nat'l City
Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573 (1948).
194. 1995 Guidelines, supra note 95, § 3.2.
195. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envtl. Techtonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990).
196. See id. at 406.
197. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993).
198. See id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at 13 (1982)).
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issue; therefore, the Court expressly left the issue open. 99 However, the Court
did hold that no conflict with the law of another nation exists if a person can
comply with both that nation's law and U.S. law.202
In the 1995 Guidelines, the DOJ and the FTC state that they will continue to
apply the principles of comity in enforcing the antitrust laws.2 1 They list several
factors, in addition to conflict of laws, to be included in their comity analysis.
20 2
They then go on to state that a decision
to prosecute an antitrust action ... represents a determination by the Executive Branch
that the importance of antitrust enforcement outweighs any relevant foreign policy
concerns. The Department does not believe that it is the role of the courts to second-guess
the executive branch's judgment as to the proper role of comity concerns under these
circumstances.0 3
This is a contentious position, pitting the executive branch against the judiciary
branch in a separation of powers controversy over which branch gets the final
word in comity analysis, at least for government-initiated actions.
2. Foreign Sovereign Compulsion Doctrine
The foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine immunizes the acts of private par-
ties from the antitrust laws if the acts were compelled by a foreign sovereign
and were carried out in the territorial limits of the foreign sovereign. 204 This
defense does not apply in situations where the conduct is merely sanctioned or
assisted by a foreign government instead of being compelled through, for example,
the imposition of significant penalties or the denial of significant benefits.20 5
Following the reasoning of Hartford Fire, the DOJ and the FTC state in the
1995 Guidelines that if it is possible for a party to comply with both the foreign
law and the U.S. antitrust laws, then the defense does not apply. 206 In fact, some
commentators believe that the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine has been
all but subsumed by the act of state doctrine in view of the Kirkpatrick decision.2 °7
199. See id. at 798-99. Likewise, in Nippon Paper the First Circuit declined to use the FTAIA
as a basis for its ultimate conclusion on the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act, and instead
relied upon settled principles of statutory construction to extend the holding of Hartford Fire to
criminal antitrust actions as well as civil. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d
1, 4, 9 (1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 685 (1998).
200. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799.
201. See 1995 Guidelines, supra note 95, § 3.2.
202. See id. The factors are: (1) a comparison of conduct within the United States and conduct
abroad; (2) the nationality of the persons involved; (3) the presence of a purpose to affect U.S.
consumers or exporters; (4) a comparison of the effects of the conduct in the United States and
effects abroad; (5) the existence of reasonable expectations furthered by the action; (6) the degree
of conflict with foreign law or economic policy; (7) the effect on enforcement activities of the other
country; and (8) the effectiveness of foreign enforcement. See id.
203. Id.
204. See id. § 3.32.
205. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 101, § 10.H.3.
206. See 1995 Guidelines, supra note 95, § 3.32.
207. E.g., Holmes, supra note 119, § 7.06.
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3. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 197608 states that a foreign sovereign
is generally immune from U.S. jurisdiction, including antitrust jurisdiction, but
with certain exceptions. 209 The primary exception allowing U.S. jurisdiction ap-
plies when the sovereign is engaged in commercial activity,210 which is determined
by the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather
than by reference to its purpose. 21' The commercial activity must have a substantial
nexus with the United States for the exception to apply.212
4. Sovereign Petition
The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 21 immunizes from application of the Sherman
Act genuine efforts to petition or influence U.S. governmental entities, even if
the effect is to restrain or monopolize trade.214 The courts are in conflict as to
whether the doctrine applies to petitioning a foreign government. 2 5 However,
the DOJ and the FTC state in the 1995 Guidelines that they will apply the doctrine
in the same manner to the petitioning of foreign governments as to the petitioning
of the U.S. government.216
5. Judgment and Discovery Blocking Statutes
The defenses discussed above are doctrines developed for foreign defendants
as part of the U.S. law-making process. The end result, even after applying all
of these jurisdictional tests and defenses, is that jurisdiction will typically not be
too great an obstacle for bringing an antitrust action against a foreign defendant
as long as there is some cognizable injury to U.S. interests. Much to the displea-
sure of foreign governments, the antitrust action will then end up being decided
on the merits. Therefore, several foreign governments have countered extraterri-
torial application of the U.S. antitrust laws by enacting blocking statutes.
Blocking statutes represent retaliatory action taken by foreign governments
in response to what they see as the United States grossly overstepping its
territorial bounds. Discovery blocking statutes limit the ability of U.S. litigants
to obtain evidence or compel production of documents in a foreign country
for use in a U.S. suit.217 Judgment blocking statutes directly or indirectly
208. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, & 1602-11 (1994).
209. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994).
210. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994).
211. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1994).
212. See 1995 Guidelines, supra note 95, § 3.31 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994)).
213. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
214. See 1995 Guidelines, supra note 95, § 3.34.
215. See SEcrboN OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 101, § 10.H.5 (discussing cases).
216. See 1995 Guidelines, supra note 95, § 3.34.
217. See Chang, supra note 93, at 296.
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restrict the enforcement of U.S. judgments in a foreign country. 218 Several
countries, including the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Australia,
have enacted blocking statutes, primarily in 'response to extraterritorial appli-
cation of the U.S. antitrust laws. 219 Some even have "claw-back" provisions,
which allow a corporation to bring suit to recover two-thirds of a U.S. treble
damage award assessed against that corporation.22 °
Japan does not have a blocking statute specifically intended to block application
of the U.S. antitrust laws. However, article 200 of the Japanese Civil Procedure
Act221 could be used as a retaliatory weapon if the United States pushes too
hard for discovery or enforcement in Japan.222 Article 200 provides that a final
judgment issued by a foreign court is recognized as binding only when: (1) the
jurisdiction of the foreign court is not denied by Japanese law or treaties; (2) if
the defeated party is a Japanese subject, service was made on him by other means
than publication, or he appeared without such notice; (3) the judgment is not
contrary to the public order or good morals of Japan; and (4) the foreign govern-
ment reciprocates through recognition of Japanese judgments .223 "Full reciprocity
does not exist with the United States by treaty, but reciprocity will be afforded
upon proof of recognition of Japanese judgments in foreign jurisdictions. 22 4
Article 200 is not the only obstacle to enforcement. Article twenty-four of the
Civil Enforcement Act requires that a competent Japanese court, in a special
action, affirm the validity of a final and conclusive foreign judgment meeting
the above conditions in order for the judgment to be executed.225
The broadness of the phrase "contrary to the public order or good morals of
Japan" would seemingly allow a Japanese judge to block just about any judgment
that is against the current agenda of the Japanese elite, perhaps even solely based
on differing economic policies of the two countries. One commentator believes
that article 200 would most likely be used to block either a judgment awarding
treble damages or an instance where the United States applies excessively liberal
jurisdictional standards,226 both of which have long been points of contention
between the United States and Japan, as well as other countries.
It is arguable that any adverse U.S. antitrust judgment is contrary to the public
order or good morals of Japan because it punishes a Japanese corporation for
what may be perfectly acceptable behavior in Japanese society. Moreover, an
adverse U.S. judgment will injure a Japanese corporation, an authority figure
218. See id.
219. See FUGATE, supra note 98, § 3.11 & n.6.
220. See Chang, supra note 93, at 298-99.
221. Act No. 61 of 1926; CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE [hereinafter C. Civ. PRO.] art. 200 (Japan).
222. See Chang, supra note 93, at 302.
223. Act No. 61 of 1926; C. Civ. PRO. art. 200 (emphasis added).
224. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, INC., MARTINDALE-HUBBELL INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST JPN-9
(1996).
225. Act. No. 4 of 1979.
226. See Chang, supra note 93, at 302.
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that provides jobs and security to Japanese citizens, and thus be contrary to the
public order.
Aside from Japanese perceptions, the U.S. courts have proven to be fair and
neutral arbiters for international dispute resolution.227 Many decisions have been
rendered in favor of a Japanese party over a U.S. party,228 thus tending to show that
Japanese concerns about xenophobic U.S. juries are unfounded. 229 But because of
differing economic policies, if strict U.S. antitrust laws and judgments are asserted
too aggressively by the United States, Japan may decide that it has no choice
but to invoke article 200 for its own protection. The United States would then
have to retaliate, and, in the worst case, the end result could be a disastrous
worldwide trade war. As the United States' and Japan's economies become more
tightly interlocked, one country's actions against the other cannot help but affect
both countries, and the rest of the world for that matter.
VII. Globalization is Straining Countries' Antitrust Laws
The problems associated with extraterritorial application of antitrust laws,
discussed in Part VI are not going to fade quietly away. On the contrary, continued
globalization of the world's economies will only exacerbate the problems.
"Global competition-that is, imports, exports, cross-border investment, and
international joint ventures-is increasing at a rapid rate. '230 The "[f]orces of
globalization and innovation that have been rippling through our economy for
more than 200 years are now ripping up the established terrain of many economic
sectors. ,231
Just fifty years ago, after World War II, each country's economy was basically
national in scope, with domestic firm competing against domestic firm. Today,
in contrast, the focus has shifted to an international level on almost all fronts.
Firms in most industries can no longer concentrate solely on national competitors
who are competing under the same rules on a fairly level playing field. Any firm
that ignores external competition runs the risk of losing its market share in a
short period of time. And this external competition may abide by very different
competitive rules.
Globalization of the world's economies can be divided into three primary
categories: (1) inter-firm competition; (2) intra-firm structures; and (3) inter-firm
227. See JOHN P. KARALIS, INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE § 5.54 &
n.11 (1992).
228. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)
(finding for Japanese defendant); United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963) (finding
against U.S. defendant); CA 9 Upholds Dismissal ofNew Claims by Maker of Videocassette Recorders,
supra note 113, at 779 (finding for Japanese defendants).
229. See KARALIS, supra note 227, § 5.54 n.1l.
230. 1 FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N STAFF, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL
MARKETPLACE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (1996).
231. Id. at 1.
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alliances. First, competition between firms now exists on an international level.
Likewise, the relevant market for many products and services has also become
international. U.S. imports and exports more than doubled between 1970 and
1994, to approximately 12% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 14% of
the GDP, respectively.232 International trade rose by more than 80% worldwide
between 1980 and 1993,233 and cross-border direct investment grew at an annual
rate of 28.9% from 1983-1989, or four times the growth in world GDP.23
Although the full effect of trade globalization remains to be seen, it is, at a
minimum, forcing each country's business culture to evolve and adapt to a new set
of competitive rules. For example, Fujitsu used to require that as many personal
computer (PC) components as possible be manufactured in-house.235 Now a Fuj-
itsu PC may contain Korean memory chips, an American hard-disk drive, and
a Taiwanese power supply, all of which are cheaper or of better quality than
equivalent Fujitsu products.236 This would have been unheard of just a few years
ago and would actually have caused shame for a Japanese company. Thus, compe-
tition in and of itself is forcing even entrenched cultural traditions to change,
an area in which government negotiation and regulation have been less than
successful.
Second, many companies' internal organizations are now globalized via cross-
national, vertically integrated structures.237 In particular, intra-firm trade between
U.S. and Japanese branches of the same company was over 71% of merchandise
trade between 1983 and 1992.238 Interestingly, Japanese networks of firms ac-
counted for almost all (92%) of this intrafirm trade.239 This factor is blurring
the concept of corporate "nationality," and is causing problems in determining
the legal rights and responsibilities of corporations. Some of the difficulties are
illustrated by the long-running legal battle between Smith Corona Corporation
of the United States and Brother Industries Limited of Japan.
In 1964, Smith Corona alleged that Brother was dumping portable typewriters
(and, later, personal word processors) on the U.S. market at predatory price
levels.2l Several administrative and judicial rulings favorable to Smith Corona
were made over the next eighteen years. However, the rulings did not significantly
help Smith Corona or damage Brother, in large part because Brother took advan-
232. See id. ch. 1 at 4-5.
233. See id. ch. 1 at 6.
234. See id.
235. See David P. Hamilton, Harder Drive: Decade After Failing, Japan Firms Try Anew to Sell
PCs in U.S., WALL ST. J., June 5, 1996, at Al.
236. See id.
237. See 1 FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N STAFF, supra note 230, ch. 1 at 9.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See Eduardo Lachica, Anti-Dumping Law Aids U.S. Firm Little, ASIAN WALL ST. J., June
19, 1992, at Al.
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tage of the increasingly cross-national structure of each of the companies.24'
Brother first avoided adverse rulings covering typewriters and word processors
made in Japan by moving its assembly operations to the United States.242 When
this loophole was finally plugged, Brother was able to avoid a subsequent adverse
ruling because by then its parts were being made in third-party countries and
not in Japan.
2 43
Ironically, Brother then turned the tables by charging Smith Corona with dump-
ing its typewriters into the United States because they were made in Singapore.
2
"
"There is no clear way to determine which company's products are more 'Ameri-
can.' -245 Although both companies are incorporated in the United States, their
ownership and manufacturing operations are truly global. The biggest difference
between the two companies is that most of Smith Corona's high-tech research
is done in the United States, while Brother's is done in Japan.
246
Third, many companies are involved in joint ventures with foreign competitors.
Firms enter these agreements for various reasons, including developing new
technology more quickly, keeping investments in new products at a reasonable
level, penetrating new markets, and sharing the increased risk of intense global
competition.247 The auto industry led the trend by teaming up with their Japanese
rivals in the early 1980s.2 41 In 1993 there were over 500 Japanese-American
alliances, primarily created in high technology industries for the purpose of shar-
ing the high cost and risk of technological development.2 49 Although strategic
alliances are not without hazards-such as opportunistic behavior by one of the
companies, the stronger company eventually buying out the weaker, or once-
friendly companies becoming bitter rivals-the trend does not show any signs
of slowing down.
250
Overall, economic globalization may actually be a self-perpetuating mecha-
nism because it is "shifting the thrust of global economics away from national
capitals to [corporate] boardrooms.' ,251 By substantially reducing tariffs, gov-
ernments have completed the most important part of what they can contribute
to the formation of a single world economy. 252 Now, corporations, merely by




244. See id. This complaint was dismissed due to lack of standing of Brother. Id.
245. Id.
246. See id.
247. See Neal Templin, Strange Bedfellows: More and More Firms Enter Joint Ventures With
Big Competitors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1995, at Al.
248. See id.
249. See Jordan D. Lewis, Blur National Boundaries, AsIAN WALL ST. J., July 12, 1993, at A8.
250. See Templin, supra note 247, at Al. Petitions to the DOJ for clearance of joint ventures
jumped from 21 in 1986 to 89 in fiscal 1995. See id.
251. Lewis, supra note 249, at A8.
252. See id.
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that knits the world more tightly together.'" 253 The more countries have at
stake in the economic well being of each other, the more they are forced to
cooperate and reach mutually agreeable compromises with each other. Even
when governments temporarily cannot get along, business interests will be
pressing for quick, equitable resolution.254
Although governments have taken a major step by starting the process of
globalization, they obviously cannot yet assume a laissez-faire approach. That
there will be a single global economy may be beyond governments' control, but
questions of exactly what that economy will look like, and how efficiently and
fairly it will function, remain open. As discussed in Part VI, much of this single
economic global market is currently "legally fragmented by national laws and
jurisdictional boundaries," creating a multitude of problems for firms and govern-
ments alike.255 Governments are not ready to give up or share the control that
they have become very accustomed to possessing over national policy decisions.
Firms engaging in international trade must meet legal standards that vary from
country to country:... standards that often conflict, if not literally, then in their
implementation.
Antitrust law is a powerful and proven tool for ensuring a healthy, efficient,
and fair marketplace. But for antitrust laws to work, they must apply equally to
every competitor in a market, or the exempt corporation will have an incredible
advantage over its rivals. In such a situation, its very goal of consumer welfare
will easily be thwarted. Because of the merging of the world's economies into
a single global market, it is more important than ever that international issues
be taken into account in antitrust policy-making and enforcement.257
VIH. Multi-national Solutions to Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
As discussed in Part VI, the application of one nation's laws to actions or
entities in a second nation implicates the principles of sovereignty and interna-
tional comity. This problem is especially evident in the application of antimonop-
oly and other trade laws due to the fundamental differences in competition law
policy between nations. Not only are the policies of the nations likely to be
different, but the anticompetitive behavior being prosecuted or limited is likely to
affect each nation quite differently. 258 The problem of international enforcement,
253. Id.
254. See id. This has occurred in, for example, the British-Argentinian conflict and the Arab-Israeli
conflict. See id.
255. 2 FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N STAFF, supra note 230, at 41.
256. See id.
257. See Caswell D. Hobbs, et al., American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law, Report
of the Special Task Force on Competition Policy, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 977, 980 (1993).
258. This is a classic example of the problem of externalities-companies in one country forming
an export cartel whose benefits (higher prices) are enjoyed in one jurisdiction, the exporting country,
but whose costs are borne in a different jurisdiction, the importing country.
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however, is extremely important; if countries are not able to work out trade
differences in a cooperative way, they likely will turn to retaliatory actions that
could be detrimental for both parties. Furthermore, enforcement actions taken
between countries whose competition law policies are generally in agreement
can still result in jurisdictional disputes and lead to blocking statutes, especially
when the penalties imposed in one country seem overly harsh to another
country.259
Perhaps the best illustration of trade friction between two nations, and also
of the need to control hostilities that trade friction generates, is the relationship
between Japan and the United States. The long running U.S.-Japan dispute is
replete with accusations of closed markets, foreign dumping, and governmental
protection of domestic industry, as well as counter-claims of lack of understanding
of local market structures, inferior products, and poor business strategies.26
U.S. -Japan trade negotiations often follow the same path. A U.S. company
makes an accusation of anti-competitive behavior by a Japanese company, The
Japanese company or the Japanese government issues an absolute denial of the
charge and presents both an explanation of why the U.S. company has been unable
to enter the foreign market and a counter-claim of anti-competitive behavior in
the United States. The U.S. government then threatens punitive trade sanctions
against a variety of Japanese products, and the Japanese government responds that
it will invoke retaliatory sanctions, thus threatening a trade war.26' Last-minute
negotiations result in an agreement, often merely to study the problem, narrowly
averting the trade war.
This section will discuss trade-related agreements and proposals that are in-
tended to reduce the trade friction among Japan, the United States, and other
countries. There are three courses of action a nation may pursue in order to
control the legal aspects of trade: unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral. While
unilateral actions are the easiest to implement (since no negotiations with other
countries are involved), the unilateral action lacks the agreement and commitment
of trading partners that the bilateral and multilateral agreements provide. On
the other hand, while the bilateral and multilateral agreements do secure the
commitment of a trading partner, they may require years of negotiation before
they are implemented.
A. UNILATERAL ACTIONS-EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT OF
ANTIMONOPOLY LAW
Past international antitrust enforcement has primarily been implemented unilat-
erally. A major difficulty encountered in unilaterally enforcing domestic competi-
259. See infra Parts VI.D & VI.E.5
260. A recent trade dispute that makes all of these accusations and counterclaims is the Kodak-Fuji
dispute discussed infra, Part VIII.
261. The threat of punitive sanctions has increased since the United States enacted the "Super
301" trade sanctions.
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tion laws on international corporations is that much of the information necessary
to build a case is physically located beyond the reach of the domestic courts;
therefore, the information is rarely subject to discovery. Although foreign courts
may assist domestic courts in obtaining testimony, discovery laws are much less
stringent in much of the world than in the United States. Additionally, many
foreign sovereigns have enacted blocking statutes that expressly prohibit coopera-
tion with U.S. courts.262
Not only does unilateral action tend to create trade friction merely by subjecting
the actions of a foreign company to domestic courts, but unilateral action also
often tends to be objectively biased toward the domestic industry. For example,
the United States defines dumping as "selling products at less than full cost, plus
10 percent for otherwise undiscovered overheads, plus an 8 percent profit margin
on sales," a definition that would hold seventeen of the twenty largest U.S.
industrial firms guilty of dumping.263 For its part, Japan uses delaying techniques
to prevent U.S. firms from gaining positions in the Japanese market that Japanese
firms cannot recapture. 2 4
B. BILATERAL ACTIONS-AGREEMENTS TO COOPERATE
Many commentators consider bilateral agreements to be the best short-term
261solution to many conflicts in the international application of competition laws.
Bilateral agreements, by definition, are limited to the minimum number of parties
required to negotiate a trade conflict. With just two parties to the negotiation,
the negotiation can focus on the source of trade friction between them. Without
all of the competing interests involved in a multilateral negotiation, a settlement
that advances the national interests of each party is much more likely to be
reached.
One potential problem with bilateral agreements is deciding how to allocate
jurisdiction.266 Allowing the country in which the activity took place priority in
jurisdiction would often preempt the application of U.S. law. Since U.S. competi-
tion laws are generally more restrictive, they may be violated when laws of the
country in which the action occurred have not been violated. Additionally, even
if the laws of both countries are violated, U.S. laws, due to the treble damages
262. See infra Part VI.E.5.
263. THUROW, supra note 9, at 236.
264. See id. at 236-37. Coming glass (optical fibers) and Motorola (cellular telephones) are two
recent examples of firms with technological advantages that have been hampered from gaining a
dominant position in the Japanese market. See id.
265. See, e.g., Chang, supra note 93, at 309-10; David J. Gerber, Symposium on Antitrust and
the Internationalization of Markets: Foreword: Antitrust and the Challenge of Internationalization,
64 CHI.-KENT L. Rav. 689, 704 (1988); Joseph P. Griffin, Possible Resolutions of International
Disputes over Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 279 (1982); Edward F.
Glynn, Jr., International Agreements to Allocate Jurisdiction Over Mergers, 1990 FORDHAM CORP.
L. INST. 35 (1991).
266. See generally infra Part VI; Chang, supra note 93, at 313.
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provision, often provide for a more severe penalty that increases the likelihood
of private action.
The United States and Canada reached a bilateral understanding for cooperation
in antitrust investigations in 1984.267 This bilateral understanding acknowledges
differences between the United States and Canada regarding policies of extraterri-
torial enforcement and investigation, and provides for notification of the other
country when a domestic antitrust investigation will likely involve the national
interests of the other country or when the investigation will inquire into informa-
tion located in the other country.268
A main feature of the understanding is the commitment by each party to ensure
the confidentiality of information exchanged under the understanding.2 69 U.S.
companies traditionally have been concerned with the protection accorded confi-
dential information provided to foreign governments since foreign governments
are assumed to operate very closely with foreign businesses, which could use
sensitive business information to the detriment of U.S. companies.
The United States has entered into similar bilateral agreements with Ger-
many,270 Australia, 71 and the European Community.272 The European agreement
is intended "to promote cooperation and coordination and lessen the possibility
or impact of [enforcement] differences." 273 Although these agreements do not
strongly bind the actions of the nations, much less unify the conduct prohibited
by the respective antitrust laws, they do provide a starting point from which
future actions may begin.
These bilateral agreements were implemented in response to relatively unsuc-
cessful attempts by U.S. firms and courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign
defendants, and have resulted in lowering trade tensions between the signing
274parties to the agreements. At least one commentator has suggested that the
current trade frictions between Japan and the United States and the resulting
political need for a resolution could lead to a U.S.-Japanese mutual cooperation
267. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States ofAmerica
as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust
Laws, Mar. 9, 1984, U.S.-Can., 23 I.L.M. 275, reprinted in 46 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1156, at 560 (Mar. 15, 1984) [hereinafter U.S.-Canadian Understanding].
268. See id.
269. See id. para. 10.
270. See Agreement Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices,
June 23, 1976, U.S.-F.R.G., 27 U.S.T. 1956; 1039 U.N.T.S. 345 (1976).
271. See Agreement Relating to Cooperation in Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, U.S.-Austl.
34 U.S.T. 389; 21 I.L.M. 702 (1982).
272. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission
of the European Communities Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, reprinted in
4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,504 (Sept. 23, 1991).
273. FUGATE, supra note 98, § 15.11 (4th ed. Supp. 1995).
274. See Lao, supra note 154, at 869.
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agreement.27 5 The Japanese government has also hinted that a mutual agreement
might be acceptable.276
As mentioned above, one of the major impediments to cooperation in the
enforcement of competition laws, other than differences in laws and enforcement
postures between countries, is the concern over confidential business data that
necessarily must be transmitted between countries for effective prosecution. To
safeguard any data provided, and to ensure the legality of transferring compelled
testimony, the United States enacted the International Antitrust Enforcement As-
sistance Act (IAEAA).277 The IAEAA, which became law in November 1994,
allows the DOJ and the FTC to enter into agreements with foreign antitrust
agencies to exchange evidence on a reciprocal basis for antitrust enforcement.
Data will not be shared between participating countries if it would violate any
laws of the sharing countries. In order to share information under the IAEAA,
other countries must enter into an Antitrust Mutual Assistance Agreement under
the IAEAA.278 So far, only Canada and the European Union have taken action
in response to the U.S. law, but neither has entered into a formal agreement
under the IAEAA.
Some bilateral progress has been made between the United States and Japan.
In 1989, the United States and Japan agreed to the Structural Impediments Initia-
tive (SII), a plan for continuing meetings designed to gain an understanding of
the causes of the persistent trade imbalance and to lead to actions by both countries
to correct these causes. The SI negotiations dealt with domestic policy and
regulation, issues not typically discussed during trade negotiations. 279 The SII
committees were to issue yearly reports with concrete suggestions for commit-
ments by each country in order to equalize trade. The SII preempted threats by
the U.S. Congress to take protectionist actions against Japan.28o
Some of the concessions extracted from the Japanese government in the first
three years of the SII include pledging to strengthen anti-monopoly enforcement,
streamlining customs-clearing procedures, and speeding up the patent approval
process from thirty-seven months to twenty-four months.28' One of the conces-
sions by the U.S. government was the pledge to reduce the deficit by raising taxes,
275. See id.
276. See Paul Blustein, Japanese Spurn Plan to Break Up Cartels; Idea to Use Antitrust Law
Draws Reaction, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1992, at D1.
277. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-12 (1994).
278. 15 U.S.C. § 6201 (1994).
279. See Mitsuo Matsushita, The Structural Impediments Initiative: An Example of Bilateral Trade
Negotiation, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 436 (1991).
280. See Jacob M. Schlesinger, U.S., Japan Spar Once More Over Trade, WALL ST. J., July
30, 1992, at A1O.
281. See id.; U.S., Japan Release Final Report On S1 Following Extended Negotiations, 59
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1473, at 20 (July 5, 1990).
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a pledge that broke a key campaign promise by President Bush and contributed to
his defeat in the 1992 election. 28
2
Although the success of the SI1 is debatable, there is a strong trend toward
increasingly rigorous enforcement of Japanese antimonopoly laws. The increased
enforcement is often attributed to the "get tough" attitudes taken with Japan in
the late 1980s (as evidenced by the threat to impose 100% penalties on luxury
cars under the super 301 statutes) and the efforts of the SIl.
C. MULTILATERAL ACTIONS-THE FUTURE OF ANTITRUST LAW?
Multilateral agreements are by their very nature more complex and more diffi-
cult to reach than bilateral agreements.2 3 The more inclusive the multilateral
agreement, the more likely that parties negotiating the agreement will have diamet-
rically opposed national interests. In spite of the difficulties with multilateral
agreements, efforts are continuing to reach a consensus on the international as-
pects of trade.2 4
As part of the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT),285 the International Antitrust Code Working Group has proposed a draft
international antitrust code.286 Although the implementation of an international
code is viewed by many to be years away,287 proposed codes do start the process
of international analysis and debate that could lead to a common code, or at least
to more uniform provisions in each nation's code.
The proposed international code would require each nation to establish a na-
tional antitrust authority with guaranteed political independence.288 Each indepen-
dent authority, as well as an international authority appointed by GATT members,
could request a national authority to prosecute a violation of the international
code. If the national authority refused, the requesting authority could step in and
prosecute in a national law court.289
282. See id.
283. Pre-existing bilateral agreements can even hinder progress on multilateral agreements when
the excluded parties in the bilateral agreement are invited to join later multilateral agreements. See
Nancy Keates, Quad Ministers To Tackle WTO Agenda As Disputes Persist, Dow JONES INTERNA-
TIONAL NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 25, 1996, available in WL, DJINSPLUS Database.
284. Recent examples of international trade accords include: The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
285. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) (hereinafter Final Act].
286. See Antitrust: Justice Official Predicts Scant Prospect of International Code, BNA INT'L
Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Feb. 8, 1994 available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, BNAIBF File.
287. See id.
288. FUGATE, supra note 98, § 15.12 (4th ed. 1991).
289. See id.
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D. INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION OF TRADE DISPUTES
International trade agreements often vest the authority to adjudicate disputes
in an international body. The major modem international adjudicatory authorities
are organized under GATT and the World Trade Organization (WTO), which
has replaced GATT. 2' 9 Although these trade dispute settlement mechanisms have
seen some use, their utility in settling complex trade issues is yet to be seen,
29 1
in part due to the very limited penalties the WTO is authorized to impose. 292
Disputes must be introduced to international bodies through the government rep-
resentative of a member country; an aggrieved business or industry cannot request
a hearing on its own.293 Once the dispute is introduced, a sixty-day period of consul-
tations is begun between the parties involved in the dispute. 294 If the consultations
do not settle the dispute, the WTO will appoint a three-member panel to hear the
dispute. 295 The appointment process may be blocked once upon request of the op-
posing party, but a second request for the appointment of a panel must be granted. 29
Once the panel hears the dispute, it has six months to render an opinion.2 97
Two trade cases against Japan that have been initiated before the international
authorities serve as examples of international enforcement. First, GATT was the
settlement forum for a dispute between Japan and the European Union over audio
cassettes; and second, the WTO recently ruled on a dispute between the United
States and Japan over access to the Japanese photographic film market.298
1. European Union vs. Japan
In 1989, the European Community (EC) began an investigation into Japanese
dumping in the European audio cassette market.2 9 In May 1991, after determining
that cassettes were being sold for less in the European market than in the Japanese
290. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay
Round): Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization (World Trade Organization)
Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. The WTO replaced GATT in
1995.
291. See id. at 7.
292. The WTO can authorize "a withdrawal of equivalent concessions." Id. at 130.
293. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement
Understanding or DSU].
294. See id. art. 4.
295. See id. art. 6.
296. See id. art. 8.7.
297. See id. art. 12.8.
298. See Report of the Panel, Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper,
WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, GTTNO File [hereinafter WTO
Photographic Report].
299. See Japan Urges EC to Lift Duties on Audiocassettes, JuI PREss TICKER SERVICE, July 26,
1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
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market, the European Community Council of Foreign Ministers approved the
imposition of permanent antidumping duties.
In response to the antidumping penalties, the Japanese government requested
a meeting with the EC, as authorized by GATT. At the meeting, the Japanese
side requested that the antidumping duties be dropped and claimed the European
Community Commission that imposed the duties had "failed to demonstrate any
causal link between the alleged dumping by Japanese companies and injury caused
to EC industry. 30 1 The Japanese also threatened to reduce their investments in
the EC if the duties were not lifted.3 °2
Since there was no agreement between the EC and the Japanese, the Japanese
requested that a GATT panel review the dispute. The GATT panel was appointed
in October 1992 to review the case, but did not release their report until May
1995.303 The panel's report found against Japan on most issues but recommended
that the European Community Committee recalculate the amount of the dumping
since the local advertising expenses did not appear to be adequately compensated
for in the European Committee's formula. °4
2. Kodak vs. Fuji Film
Another case alleging anticompetitive actions by a Japanese company, and by
the Japanese government itself, was recently decided by a WTO panel.3 °5 This
case, in which Kodak charged Fuji with anticompetitive behavior in unfairly
preventing access to the Japanese domestic film market, illustrates many of the
exclusive-dealing and distribution problems that U.S. companies claim to face
in Japan-abuses with which Japanese companies typically are charged.
The dispute formally began on May 18, 1995 when Kodak lodged a complaint
with the U.S. Trade Representative's Office. 306 Kodak alleged that "anticompeti-
tive rebate schemes, resale-price maintenance, and horizontal price-fixing" pre-
300. See EC Council OKs Duties on Japanese, Korean Audio Tapes, JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE,
May 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
301. Japan May Cut EC Investment To Protest Duties, JuI PRESS TICKER SERVICE, May 1, 1991,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. While the link between dumping and the injury
would be implied under U.S. antitrust jurisprudence, a requirement that the link be proven is more
in line with Japanese antitrust jurisprudence. See First, supra note 63, at 147-48.
302. See Japan May Cut EC Investment to Protest Duties, supra note 301. This threatened strategy
is contrary to the Japanese actions with regard to photographic paper. In the photographic paper
industry, Fuji invested in U.S.-based manufacturing capability to bypass import duties on photographic
paper. See EC Probe On Japanese Color TVs Unlikely, Jul PRESS TICKER SERVICE, Nov. 4, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
303. See Bhushan Bahree, GATT Panel Rejects Complaint From Japan in EU Cassette Case,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., May 5, 1995, at AS.
304. However, the 15.2% to 25.5% duties were far below the 44.5% to 64.2% allowed by the
formula. See id.
305. WTO Photographic Report, supra note 298.
306. Some have questioned the motives behind the timing of Kodak's complaint because it came
at a time when the United States and Japanese governments were on the brink of a trade war over
the threatened imposition of Super 301 trade sanctions against imported Japanese luxury cars.
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vented Kodak from penetrating the Japanese market, 30 7 and asked the U.S. trade
representative to open a complaint with the Japanese and start the process of
imposing sanctions.3 8
Japan refused to negotiate the dispute because of what it deemed improper
venue. The Japanese government complained that Kodak was trying to gain lever-
age from an ongoing U.S. -Japan auto parts dispute, and that if Kodak had a
complaint about the Japanese market, the proper forum was the JFTC. 309 Even
though Kodak did not formally complain to the JFTC, the commission did launch
an investigation into business practices in the consumer photographic film mar-
ket.3 0 Eventually, Kodak filed a complaint with the JFrC. 31
Kodak's timing in bringing the charges against Fuji may have been an attempt
to gain political leverage and garner support for the U.S. imposition of punitive
trade sanctions. The political situation in the United States, however, may have
doomed Kodak to the WTO forum, because the Clinton administration did not
want to appear soft on trade issues or risk starting a trade war during an election
year. 312 Transferring the dispute to the WTO allowed the administration to avoid
the potential fallout from adjudicating the dispute while simultaneously showing
support for the WTO.313
The United States' complaint before the WTO included three main charges.314
As summarized by the WTO dispute resolution panel, these included:
(1) distributions measures, which allegedly encouraged and facilitated the creation of
market structures for film and paper in which imports are excluded from traditional
distribution channels; (2) the Large Stores Law, which allegedly restricts the growth
of an alternative distribution channel for film; and (3) restrictions on premiums and
misleading representations under the Premiums Law, which allegedly disadvantage
imports by restricting sales promotions.
315
Central to the first allegation is the Japanese distribution system. 3t6 Nearly
seventy percent of the photographic products sold in Japan pass through one
307. Wendy Bounds & Bob Davis, Kodak Charges Japan and Fuji on Trade Issues, ASIAN WALL
ST. J., May 19, 1995, at A2.
308. The U.S. trade representative had forty-five days to decide whether to accept Kodak's petition.
See id. See U.S. Will Investigate Kodak's Allegations Against Fuji Photo, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July
4, 1995, at A2.
309. See Helene Cooper & Wendy Bounds, Kodak-Fuji Dispute May Go to WTO, ASIAN WALL
ST. J., Feb. 23, 1996, at A17.
310. See Hamilton & Bounds, supra note 69, at Al. One must question the sincerity of the
investigation, however, when, even before the investigation began, the FTC spokesman declared,
"this is not an investigation into a case that involves a violation." Id.
311. See Kodak Files Protest With Japan Agency In Dispute With Fuji, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8,
1996, at B5.
312. See Cooper & Bounds, supra note 309, at B5.
313. See id. at A7.
314. See WTO Photographic Report, supra note 298, 4.1.
315. Id.
316. See U.S., Japan Launch Talks On Segment of Film Dispute, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES,
REG., ECON., & L. (BNA) 217, at D38 (Nov. 8, 1996), available in WL, BNA-ATR Library.
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of four distributors, called tokuyakuten.317 Kodak claimed that Fuji maintains
exclusive agreements with the distributors that bind the distributors to Fuji by
"financial, operational and technical" means.31 For example, Fuji owns stock
in two of the four distributors and also owns stock in the banks that lend to all
of them. 319 Furthermore, Fuji offers large year-end rebates to the distributors
and the stores that carry the film. The rebates encourage wholesalers to purchase
greater volume from fewer suppliers. 2 °
Fuji blamed Kodak for the lack of distribution channels, saying that Kodak
has not even attempted to get the four major distributors to carry Kodak film in
twenty years. 32' Kodak denied a lack of effort on its part and claimed to have
contacted one of the distributors in the past year.322 The WTO panel found that
three of the four distributors were already single-brand distributors two years
before the issuance of the MITI guidelines complained about by the United
States. 323 The fourth became a single-brand distributor only after Kodak refused
to deal with it directly.324
The second allegation addressed legal restrictions on foreign access to Japanese
retail service establishments. 325 This allegation focused on Japan's Large-Scale
Retail Store Laws.326 The United States claimed that these laws block access to
the Japanese market by limiting the growth of large stores, which could offer
the best chance for an alternative route for foreign products.327 The third allegation
charged that Premium Laws and certain private sector business practices were
discriminatory and exclusionary, and that some administrative decisions were
not made public as required. 3 ' These actions allegedly denied Kodak the expected
benefit from later trade concessions and agreements.329
317. See Wendy Bounds & Helene Cooper, Kodak Wants U.S. to Force Japan to Open Film
Market, ASIAN WALL ST. J., June 2, 1995, at At.
318. Id.
319. See Wendy Bounds, Film Exposures: Fuji, Accused by Kodak of Hogging Markets, Spits
Back: 'You Too', WALL ST. J., July 31, 1995, at Al.
320. See WTO Photographic Report, supra note 298, 4.4.
321. See Hamilton et al., supra note 69, at A ll.
322. See id.
323. See WTO Photographic Report, supra note 298, 4.9.
324. See id.
325. See Barshefsky Confident of U.S. Case at WTO in Film Dispute with Japan, DAILY REP.
FOR Ex EcUTIvEs, REG., ECON., & L. (BNA) 195, at D29 (Oct. 8, 1996), available in WL, BNA-ATR
Library.
326. See U.S., Japan Launch Talks On Segment of Film Dispute, supra note 315.
327. See EU Joins U.S. in WTO Complaint Against Japan Over Film Market Dispute, DAILY
REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, REG., ECON., & L. (BNA) 201, at D5 (Oct. 17, 1996), available in WL,
BNA-ATR Library.
328. See Barshefsky Confident of U.S. Case at WTO in Film Dispute with Japan, supra note 325.
See also U.S., Japan Launch Talks On Segment of Film Dispute, supra note 316.
329. The U.S. position that trade measures adopted between 1964 and 1973 deprived the United
States of concessions granted to it in 1979 and 1994 was viewed by some as illogical. See Patrick
A. Messerlin, Rule of Law: How to Wreck the WTO, WALL ST. J., July 23, 1997, at A19.
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The WTO panel held for Japan on all counts, stating that the United States
failed to prove its charges .330 The Kodak case is somewhat unique in that the
harms complained of were not tariffs or prohibitive regulations imposed by a
government agency, but rather were a result of the internal structure of the
Japanese market itself.331 Some feel that the WTO did not have jurisdiction to
hear U.S. claims against private sector actions in Japan. The United States,
however, claimed that at least some of Fuji's actions were "conducted with the
knowledge and participation of the government of Japan,' , 332 stating that in the
1970s, when Japan promised to open its markets to foreign film, officials at MITI
conspired with Fuji to create boeiki shohon jiyuka taisaku, or "liberalization
countermeasures. 
333
To find jurisdiction, the dispute resolution panel applied a broad definition of
the term "measure" used in the GATT articles. For example, the panel noted
that the Japanese government acts through non-binding administrative guid-
ance. 334 The panel decided that, depending on the circumstances, administrative
guidance, and policy statements by various government officials and agencies
would be considered measures under articles 111:4 and XXIII: 1 (b) of GATT. 3 5
The decision may indicate that the WTO is incapable of addressing the subtle
barriers that are allegedly common in Japan.336
The aftermath of the Kodak decision also will be instructive as to what actions
the United States will take unilaterally after losing before a multilateral body.
Although the United States decided not to appeal the Kodak decision, it has
announced it considers obligations statements made by the government of Japan
in legal briefs as binding. 337 Furthermore, it is considering other means of forcing
open the Japanese photographic film market, including the unilateral imposition
of tariffs and penalties.338
IX. Conclusion
Japan and the United States have competition laws that, while facially quite
similar, are applied in very different manners. Differences in the historical devel-
330. See WTO Photographic Report, supra note 298, 10.402-.404.
331. See Hiawatha Bray, Kodak's Trade Complaint Rejected, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 6, 1997, at
Al.
332. U.S. Will Investigate Kodak's Allegations Against Fuji Photo, supra note 308, at A2.
333. Greg Rushford, Kodak vs. Fuji: Overexposed!, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 14, 1995, at A6.
The parties disagreed on the proper translation of the Japanese word taisaku. The United States used
the word "countermeasures," while Japan claimed "measure" or "policy in response to" was the
correct meaning. WTO Photographic Report, supra note 298, at Annex Translation Problems.
334. See WTO Photographic Report, supra note 298, 10.44.
335. See e.g., id. 10.42-.44, 10.376.
336. Paul Blustein, World Trade Panel Sides With Japan in Kodak Sales Dispute, WASH. POST,
Dec. 6, 1997, at Al.
337. See Bob Davis & Laura Johannes, Kodak and U.S. Government Team Up For New Drive
On Japan's Film Market, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1998, at A4.
338. See Evelyn Iritani, U.S., Kodak Lose Japan Trade Suit, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1997, at D1.
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opment of the two countries' economies, societal values, and the independence
of the enforcement and judicial branches of the two governments all combine to
create substantially divergent systems of antitrust law. Each country has a unique
perspective on the proper role of cooperation and competition among related
businesses and industries, which likely results from each nation's unique view-
point on the role of the individual in society. While U.S. companies are strictly
limited from collective behavior that is arguably efficient by laws that are designed
to be punitive, the Japanese companies are encouraged to take advantage of the
enhanced efficiency derived from cooperation and are gently prodded back into
line if the cooperation is excessive. Conflict ensues whenever the two systems
collide, as is inevitable in a global economy. While the U.S. government com-
plains to Japan about the resulting trade imbalance, the Japanese government
naturally views U.S. competition laws as part of the problem.
Although the two systems are incompatible enough that a complete harmoniza-
tion of laws cannot occur in the foreseeable future, each government can begin
to eliminate the behavior that is most offensive to the other. For Japan, this means
taking serious efforts to end the cartels, combines, keiretsu, and especially the
prevailing societal attitudes that prevent foreign access to the domestic markets.
For the United States, this means elimination of the treble damage penalty, which
arguably has a chilling effect on efficient legal behavior; greater consideration
for Japan's sovereignty, which should increase trust and mutual respect between
the two countries; and respect for the decisions of international bodies such as
the WTO, which should increase the legitimacy of the WTO in future disputes.
While bilateral agreements achieving harmonization between countries are
useful, the ultimate goal should be a world-wide multilateral agreement harmoniz-
ing the antitrust laws of all nations. At present, the WTO Dispute Resolution
Body represents a promising, if not fully tested, attempt at cooperation between
a majority of the world's nations. Harmonization is a lofty goal, especially in
light of each nation's self-interest. Globalization is intertwining the world's econo-
mies to such an extent, however, that the same competition laws must apply to
all, or they will be effective for none. Vigorous but fair global competition in
which the same rules apply to every market participant assures the best utilization
and allocation of the world's resources.
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